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Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO

Politics & Social Sciences

Strategic Studies Institute

Politics & Government

Military Bookshop

Provided by the U.S. Army War College, this book is the result of the collaboration of scholars and security experts from many disciplines and nations who have come together to tackle questions that are long overdue for an answer:What role is left, if any, for tactical nuclear arms?What are the strategic implications of their presence or removal?How have the Russian, European, and Russian views evolved on this issue, and how much opportunity is there to bring them into a coordinated agreement? What does it mean for NATO to be a 'nuclear alliance?"Should arms control processes like START or conventional arms control include NSNWs or are tactical nuclear arms so outdated that they should be removed from the agenda and reduced laterally?

In the many decades since the German army smashed into the American lines in the Battle of the Bulge, opinion of the U.S. senior command's leadership capabilities has fluctuated between hero worship and scorn, with the latter view becoming more predominant as the initial glow of victory faded. Rather than a conventional study of the Ardennes offensive, "Generals of the Ardennes: American Leadership in the Battle of the Bulge" studies five examples of American command leadership at different levels to answer two questions: what characteristics of leadership did these generals display, and how did they affect the overall battle? Based on extensive documentation and personal interviews with participants, "Generals of the Ardennes" provides a description and analysis of: Dwight Eisenhower's role as coalition commander; Omar Bradley's direction of the 12th Army Group during the crisis; Lieutenant General William Simpson's contribution to the Ninth Army's part in defeating the German onslaught; Major General Troy Middleton's stand with the VIII Corps in the center of the fighting; Major General Alan Jones and Brigadier General Bruce Clarke and how they dealt with the challenges and confusions at "the point of the spear". Amid the countless books in many languages that tell and retell the history of the Battle of the Bulge, this one is unique in its focus on American generalship during those epic and decisive weeks that turned the tide of World War II in Europe. For that reason, it stands as both a significant history and an important document for the study of command and control. First published in 1994. 452 pages. ill.

Generals of the Ardennes: American Leadership in the Battle of the Bulge

History

Morelock, Jerry D.

Military

In August 1964, thousands of Simba rebels attacked and captured the city of Stanleyville in the newly independent Republic of the Congo and took more than 1,600 European and American residents as hostages, threatening to kill them if any attempt was made to recapture the city. In November of that year, after months of increasingly tense and complex discussions among the governments whose nationals were being held, an airborne assault by Belgian paracommandos dropped by American Air Force planes, combined with a CIA-piloted air strike against the Stanleyville airport, liberated most of the hostages, but only after a Simba-initiated massacre. "Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964-1965" provides both the political background to these events and a detailed account of the actual operations: Dragon Rouge, the operations in Stanleyville, and Dragon Noir, focused on the city of Paulis, several hundred miles away. The book highlights the difficulties in organizing an international rescue effort with insufficient joint planning and inadequate command and control among the Belgian and American forces, as well as their differing political ideas and goals. The ad hoc nature of the planning was exemplified by an initial American Special Forces plan to air drop its forces east of Stanleyville and float down the river to Stanleyville. This plan was aborted when it was pointed out that the existence of Stanley Falls between the drop zone and the city was an insuperable obstacle. The operation also suffered from the Belgian commander's colonial-era contempt for the numerical strength of the Simbas and American fears of what was in reality a non-existent Communist element in the rebel movement. "Dragon Operations" demonstrates that, despite the slapdash nature of their planning and communications aspects, as well as the distance involved, the austere support, the large number of hostages, and a lack of intelligence data, they were remarkably successful in rescuing most of the hostages. Although less than ideal, the operations worked better than expected, given the conditions under which they were conducted. This important study of an almost forgotten episode of the Cold War has much to offer to military strategists and tacticians, political scientists and students of contemporary history alike. Orginally published in 1988: 236 p. maps. ill.

Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964-1965

Franks, Frederick M.

Combat Studies Institute

Odom, Thomas P.

Africa

Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1969

Low-intensity conflict (LIC) often has been viewed as the wrong kind of warfare for the American military, dating back to the war in Vietnam and extending to the present conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. From the American perspective, LIC occurs when the U.S. military must seek limited aims with a relatively modest number of available regular forces, as opposed to the larger commitments that bring into play the full panoply of advanced technology and massive commitments of troops. Yet despite the conventional view, U.S. forces have achieved success in LIC, albeit "under the radar" and with credit largely assigned to allied forces, in a number of counterguerrilla wars in the 1960s. "Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1969" focuses on what the author calls the Second Korean conflict, which flared up in November 1966 and sputtered to an ill-defined halt more than three years later. During that time, North Korean special operations teams had challenged the U.S. and its South Korean allies in every category of low-intensity conflict - small-scale skirmishes along the Demilitarized Zone between the two Koreas, spectacular terrorist strikes, attempts to foment a viable insurgency in the South, and even the seizure of the USS Pueblo - and failed. This book offers a case study in how an operational-level commander, General Charles H. Bonesteel III, met the challenge of LIC. He and his Korean subordinates crafted a series of shrewd, pragmatic measures that defanged North Korea's aggressive campaign. According to the convincing argument made by "Scenes from an Unfinished War", because the U.S. successfully fought the "wrong kind" of war, it likely blocked another kind of wrong war - a land war in Asia. The Second Korean Conflict serves as a corrective to assumptions about the American military's abilities to formulate and execute a winning counterinsurgency strategy. Originally published in 1991. 180 pages. maps. ill.

Bolger, Colonel Daniel P

The Voynich Manuscript - An Elegant Enigma

The Voynich manuscript, often dubbed “the world’s most mysterious manuscript,” is a remarkable conglomeration, written in an unknown script and language and profusely illustrated with carefully rendered images of unidentified plants, enigmatic astronomical drawings, and puzzling human figures. Known to have existed since the late 16th century, when it was owned by the physician of that most enigmatic of rulers, the Emperor Rudolf II of Austria, it has been labeled variously as a magical manual, a herbarium, and a hoax. Both scholarly researchers and individual enthusiasts have linked this remarkable document to the Hermetic tradition, astrology, demonic and angelic magic, alchemy, the Cabala, and the history of Hindu-Arabic numerals. Many believe that it is an enormous –  and so far indecipherable –  book code within which the secrets of one or more of these subjects are concealed. "The Voynich Manuscript: An Elegant Enigma" provides a careful examination of this last hypothesis while also touching upon the myriad other possibilities raised by previous researchers. It gives a brief history of this mysterious work and a detailed discussion of the many unsuccessful attempts to crack the presumed code or cipher, or at least discover whether it is written in a natural or artificial language.  This fascinating study from the U.S. National Security Agency also raises the possibility, suggested more frequently in recent years, that the Voynich manuscript is a hoax. It concludes that, if so, the hoaxer must have labored for many years to create it – surely too much effort for very little known return. Also, given the penchant of early modern scientists and philosophers to disguise their researches through the use of symbols and allegory, its obscurity is not unprecedented, although obviously extreme.  Whether a hoax, a cipher, or a key to the infinite, this account of the Voynich manuscript and the efforts to probe its true meaning tells a great true story that rivals any bestselling novel. Scholars, puzzle solvers, and anyone interested in historical mysteries will find much to ponder in this indispensable study.

D'Imperio, M.E.

Center for Cryptologic History

With the onset of World War II, the American organizations responsible for the vital wartime function of communications intelligence (COMINT) were forced to change drastically. In addition to the daunting challenges of rapid operational expansion, the peacetime processes of U.S. Army and Navy COMINT proved inadequate to support active military operations on a worldwide scale.  With national survival and individual lives at stake, more information, and its timely dissemination to both U.S. forces and those of its close ally, the United Kingdom, quickly became a top priority. "A History of U.S. Communications Intelligence during World War II: Policy and Administration" tells the story of the profound organizational changes wrought on U.S. COMINT by rapid expansion, urgent requirements for information, and international agreements. While the services never completely solved the problems posed by these challenges, by war's end they had created structures and implemented policies which, however cumbersome, achieved high levels of combat support. After covering the initial year of expansion, this study examines such issues as: The Army-British COMINT agreement of 1943 and the ENIGMA crisis; British-U.S. Navy COMINT agreements in 1943 and 1944; Jurisdictional problems regarding clandestine communications; Army and Navy movement to full cooperation, 1944-1945; Internal organizational developments in the Army and Navy. In addition to this comprehensive cover of organizational issues, "A History of U.S. Communications Intelligence during World War II" also sheds new light on the U.S.-UK controversy over U.S. denial of Alan Turing's access to scrambler technology developed at Bell Labs, conflicts between the Director of Naval Intelligence and J. Edgar Hoover's FBI over sharing intelligence information, and the tension between Army and Navy COMINT and the OSS, which had its own methods of obtaining data from British intelligence sources. Scholars and intelligence professionals alike will find much of value in this detailed and copiously documented study.

A History of US Communications Intelligence during WWII: Policy and Administration

Benson, Robert Louis

Although the Russian war plans of both Napoleon and Hitler miscarried seriously in terms of casualties and materiel even prior to the onset of winter, "General Winter" was indeed a major contributor to the magnitude of their subsequent problems and casualties. No consideration of warfare in European Russia can ignore the harshness of that region's climate, and the successful war planner must adapt to those conditions or risk emulating their powerful predecessors. Fighting the Russians in Winter: Three Case Studies cites three examples drawn from history to illustrate the nature of a winter war in Russia: The undeclared Allied-Soviet War in Northern Russia in 1918-1919; The destruction of the Soviet 44th Motorized Rifle Division in the Winter War against Finland; Aspects of Nazi-Soviet Warfare in 1941-1942. Two of these three campaigns clearly demonstrated the superiority of the defense over the offense, while the Winter War, although the 44th Division fought defensively, it was as part of the overall Soviet strategic offensive. Given the lessons learned by both sides in the 1918-1919 campaign - lessons vitiated in that conflict due to lack of adequate supplies and troops - it is remarkable that the same issues, such as lack of adequate clothing and lubricants, reoccurred in 1941-1942. All three case studies in "Fighting the Russians in Winter" illustrate the need for thorough preparations, specialized training, and appropriate equipment for any winter operations in such an environment. They also present dramatic proof of the cost of ignoring those lessons. Originally published in 1981: 60 p. maps. ill.

Fighting the Russians in Winter: Three Case Studies

Chew, Allen F.

Stone, Howard F.

The Six Day War of June 1967 saw the Israel Defense Force (IDF) achieve a decisive military victory over Egypt, Jordan, and Syria while sustaining relatively few casualties. Despite the subsequent image of Israel as a regional military superpower, Egypt attacked again in 1973, eventually resulting in a peace treaty that promised to return the entire Sinai to Egypt. It is the contention of "The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory" that the IDF's dramatic 1967 victory unconsciously created an albatross in the form of a belief in its own invulnerability coupled with the belief that Egypt would perform as poorly in the next war as it had in this one. In a spirit of overconfidence, Israel prepared to fight its next war just as it had in 1967. The 1973 attack caught Israel off guard, the Egyptians performed much better than expected, and, even after the IDF recovered from its initial stumbles, Egypt was by no means out of the game militarily. Once a cease-fire took effect, the Israelis quickly grasped how ill prepared their army had been for war and the resultant three weeks of hard fighting and relatively heavy casualties. As the author notes, "If the United States had experienced equivalent losses in the Vietnam War, it would have suffered 200,000 American dead - a figure four times the actual number." Given this situation, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat quickly proposed a negotiated peace, which a suddenly war-weary Israeli public warily accepted. Both as an incisive narrative of the 1973 war and an analysis of the self-deception and overconfidence that too decisive a victory can breed, "The 1973 Arab-Israeli War" is an invaluable work of scholarship as well as a cautionary tale for students and practitioners of modern warfare. Orginally published in 1996: 104 p. maps. ill.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory

Garwych, George W

Middle East

Provides detailed case studies from the Vietnam war and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Convoy Ambush Case Studies

Killblane, Richard E.

Transportation Corps History Office

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Books by Military Bookshop

See the best price to sell, buy or rent books by the Military Bookshop publisher. BookScouter helps to compare book prices from 25+ online bookstores and 30+ buyback vendors with a single search.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO

Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO

Generals of the Ardennes: American Leadership in the Battle of the Bulge

Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964-1965

Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1969

The Voynich Manuscript - An Elegant Enigma

A History of US Communications Intelligence during WWII: Policy and Administration

Fighting the Russians in Winter: Three Case Studies

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory

Convoy Ambush Case Studies