The Lewis and Clark staff ride presented in this booklet, by contrast, focuses on a US Army mission to explore the unknown during a time of peace. By studying the Lewis and Clark Expedition of 1804-1806, traveling the route, and visiting the places where key decisions were made, the military professional can gain a greater appreciation of what it means to be a leader in today's Army and gain an enhanced understanding of the time-honored leadership principle of Be, Know, Do. The captains had commendable character, the "Be" of Be, Know, Do.They had the courage to do what was right regardless of the circumstances or the consequences. In short, they lived the Army values of honor, loyalty, and selfless service. The Lewis and Clark Expedition 1804-06 is an effective vehicle for a staff ride. It raises a variety of teaching points that are relevant to today's officer. In addition, the expedition exemplifies the values that have guided the American soldier to the present day. The Staff Ride Handbook for the Lewis and Clark Expedition provides a systematic approach to the analysis of this key operation.

The Corps of Discovery Staff Ride Handbook for the Lewis and Clark Expedition

History

Collins, Charles

Combat Studies Institute

Americas

Independently published

Principles of War: A Translation from the Japanese

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

WEST, JOSEPH

Military

The Arab Rebellion and British Counter-rebellion campaign of 1936 to 1939 in Palestine exhibited many features of modern insurgency and counterinsurgency. This thesis traces the British military thought and practice for countering rebellion as influenced by their Small Wars' experiences, and it then presents the rebellion and counter-rebellion campaign as a case study in their military and political contexts. This study focuses on the evolution of the internal security strategy, and it examines the actions of Captain Orde Wingate both within the campaign and in his attmept to influence it at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. This research is intended to inform military practitioners about the campaign while highlighting the issues that are encountered when they seek to: (1) apply the contemporary wisdom of military thought and practice to a specific operational environemt; (2) negotaite the policy constraints on the possible military "solutions" to the security problems incurred by insurgency; (3) influence various facets of the greater campaign when outside the hierarchy of responsibility and authority to do so; and (4) expose some of the issues involved with a counterinsurgent force's utilization of portions of the indigenous population toward converging interests. This study find that Wingate sought to shape the evolving internal security strategy through both military and political channels, and that he utilized a variety of mechanisms to do so. Despite tactical successes in his validation of proofs of concept through the Special Night Squads, his determined efforts failed to achieve his stated goals at the operational and strategic levels.

Orde Wingate and the British Internal Security Strategy During the Arab Rebellio

Lehenbauer, Mark

CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform

The Rhodesian African Rifles overcame profoundly divisive racist and tribal differences among its members because a transcendent "regimental culture" superseded the disparate cultures of its individual soldiers and officers. The RAR's culture grew around the traditions of the British regimental system, after which the RAR was patterned. The soldiers of the RAR, regardless of racial or tribal background, identified themselves first as soldiers and members of the regiment, before their individual race and tribe. Regimental history and traditions, as well as shared hardships on deployments and training were mechanisms that forced officers and soldiers to see past differences. The RAR is remarkable because these bonds stayed true through to the end of the war, through incredible pressure on black Rhodesians to succumb to the black nationalist groups and cast off a government that was portrayed to them as oppressive, racist and hateful. Through the end of the Bush War, 1965-1980, RAR soldiers remained loyal and steadfast to their regiment, and that must be their legacy. In the end, the values of the government were irrelevant. It was the regiment that drew these men in, and their loyalty was more to their comrades and their heritage than to any particular government or cause.

The Rhodesian African Rifles: The Growth and Adaptation of a Multicultural Regiment through the Rhodesian Bush War, 1965-1980 (Art of War Papers series)

Stewart, Michael P

A staff ride to a major battleﬁeld is an excellent tool for the historical education of members of the Armed Forces. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has been conducting staff rides since the 1900s. Captain Arthur L. Wagner was an instructor at Fort Leavenworth in the 1890s, and he believed an ofﬁcer’s education had become too far removed from the reality of war. He pondered how to get the experience of combat to ofﬁcers who had only experienced peace. His answer was the staff ride, a program in which stu-dents studied a major battle and then went to the actual ﬁeld to complete the study. Wagner did not live to see staff rides added to the curriculum at Fort Leavenworth, but in 1906, the ﬁrst staff ride was added to the Fort Leavenworth “experience.” Major Eben Swift led 12 students on a study of the Atlanta Campaign of 1864. On and off, staff rides have been a part of the curriculum ever since.Staff rides are not just limited to schoolhouse education. For years, unit commanders have conducted numerous staff rides to varied battle-ﬁelds as part of their ofﬁcers’ and soldiers’ professional development. In support of these ﬁeld commanders, the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth published staff ride guides to assist personnel planning and conducting staff rides worldwide.In 2002, General John Abrams, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commanding general, recognized the impact and importance of staff rides and revamped the Staff Ride Team. TRADOC assigned personnel full time to Fort Leavenworth to lead staff rides for the Army. As part of this initiative, the Staff Ride Team is also dedicated to publishing staff ride handbooks in support of the Army.The Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Shiloh, 6-7 April 1862 pro-vides a systematic approach to the analysis of this early battle in the west-ern theater of the American Civil War. Part I describes the organization of both armies, detailing their weapons, tactics, logistics, engineering, com-munications, and medical support. Part II consists of a campaign overview that allows students to understand how the armies met on the battleﬁeld. Part III is a suggested route for conducting a staff ride at Shiloh. For each stop, or “stand,” there is a set of travel directions, a description of the ac-tion that occurred there, vignettes by battle participants, a list of discussion or teaching points that a staff ride leader can explore at the stand, and a map of the battle actions.

Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Shiloh, 6-7 April 1862

In August 1964, thousands of Simba rebels attacked and captured the city of Stanleyville in the newly independent Republic of the Congo and took more than 1,600 European and American residents as hostages, threatening to kill them if any attempt was made to recapture the city. In November of that year, after months of increasingly tense and complex discussions among the governments whose nationals were being held, an airborne assault by Belgian paracommandos dropped by American Air Force planes, combined with a CIA-piloted air strike against the Stanleyville airport, liberated most of the hostages, but only after a Simba-initiated massacre. "Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964-1965" provides both the political background to these events and a detailed account of the actual operations: Dragon Rouge, the operations in Stanleyville, and Dragon Noir, focused on the city of Paulis, several hundred miles away. The book highlights the difficulties in organizing an international rescue effort with insufficient joint planning and inadequate command and control among the Belgian and American forces, as well as their differing political ideas and goals. The ad hoc nature of the planning was exemplified by an initial American Special Forces plan to air drop its forces east of Stanleyville and float down the river to Stanleyville. This plan was aborted when it was pointed out that the existence of Stanley Falls between the drop zone and the city was an insuperable obstacle. The operation also suffered from the Belgian commander's colonial-era contempt for the numerical strength of the Simbas and American fears of what was in reality a non-existent Communist element in the rebel movement. "Dragon Operations" demonstrates that, despite the slapdash nature of their planning and communications aspects, as well as the distance involved, the austere support, the large number of hostages, and a lack of intelligence data, they were remarkably successful in rescuing most of the hostages. Although less than ideal, the operations worked better than expected, given the conditions under which they were conducted. This important study of an almost forgotten episode of the Cold War has much to offer to military strategists and tacticians, political scientists and students of contemporary history alike. Orginally published in 1988: 236 p. maps. ill.

Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964-1965

Franks, Frederick M.

Odom, Thomas P.

Africa

Military Bookshop

Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1969

Low-intensity conflict (LIC) often has been viewed as the wrong kind of warfare for the American military, dating back to the war in Vietnam and extending to the present conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. From the American perspective, LIC occurs when the U.S. military must seek limited aims with a relatively modest number of available regular forces, as opposed to the larger commitments that bring into play the full panoply of advanced technology and massive commitments of troops. Yet despite the conventional view, U.S. forces have achieved success in LIC, albeit "under the radar" and with credit largely assigned to allied forces, in a number of counterguerrilla wars in the 1960s. "Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1969" focuses on what the author calls the Second Korean conflict, which flared up in November 1966 and sputtered to an ill-defined halt more than three years later. During that time, North Korean special operations teams had challenged the U.S. and its South Korean allies in every category of low-intensity conflict - small-scale skirmishes along the Demilitarized Zone between the two Koreas, spectacular terrorist strikes, attempts to foment a viable insurgency in the South, and even the seizure of the USS Pueblo - and failed. This book offers a case study in how an operational-level commander, General Charles H. Bonesteel III, met the challenge of LIC. He and his Korean subordinates crafted a series of shrewd, pragmatic measures that defanged North Korea's aggressive campaign. According to the convincing argument made by "Scenes from an Unfinished War", because the U.S. successfully fought the "wrong kind" of war, it likely blocked another kind of wrong war - a land war in Asia. The Second Korean Conflict serves as a corrective to assumptions about the American military's abilities to formulate and execute a winning counterinsurgency strategy. Originally published in 1991. 180 pages. maps. ill.

Bolger, Colonel Daniel P

Although the Russian war plans of both Napoleon and Hitler miscarried seriously in terms of casualties and materiel even prior to the onset of winter, "General Winter" was indeed a major contributor to the magnitude of their subsequent problems and casualties. No consideration of warfare in European Russia can ignore the harshness of that region's climate, and the successful war planner must adapt to those conditions or risk emulating their powerful predecessors. Fighting the Russians in Winter: Three Case Studies cites three examples drawn from history to illustrate the nature of a winter war in Russia: The undeclared Allied-Soviet War in Northern Russia in 1918-1919; The destruction of the Soviet 44th Motorized Rifle Division in the Winter War against Finland; Aspects of Nazi-Soviet Warfare in 1941-1942. Two of these three campaigns clearly demonstrated the superiority of the defense over the offense, while the Winter War, although the 44th Division fought defensively, it was as part of the overall Soviet strategic offensive. Given the lessons learned by both sides in the 1918-1919 campaign - lessons vitiated in that conflict due to lack of adequate supplies and troops - it is remarkable that the same issues, such as lack of adequate clothing and lubricants, reoccurred in 1941-1942. All three case studies in "Fighting the Russians in Winter" illustrate the need for thorough preparations, specialized training, and appropriate equipment for any winter operations in such an environment. They also present dramatic proof of the cost of ignoring those lessons. Originally published in 1981: 60 p. maps. ill.

Fighting the Russians in Winter: Three Case Studies

Chew, Allen F.

Stone, Howard F.

The Six Day War of June 1967 saw the Israel Defense Force (IDF) achieve a decisive military victory over Egypt, Jordan, and Syria while sustaining relatively few casualties. Despite the subsequent image of Israel as a regional military superpower, Egypt attacked again in 1973, eventually resulting in a peace treaty that promised to return the entire Sinai to Egypt. It is the contention of "The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory" that the IDF's dramatic 1967 victory unconsciously created an albatross in the form of a belief in its own invulnerability coupled with the belief that Egypt would perform as poorly in the next war as it had in this one. In a spirit of overconfidence, Israel prepared to fight its next war just as it had in 1967. The 1973 attack caught Israel off guard, the Egyptians performed much better than expected, and, even after the IDF recovered from its initial stumbles, Egypt was by no means out of the game militarily. Once a cease-fire took effect, the Israelis quickly grasped how ill prepared their army had been for war and the resultant three weeks of hard fighting and relatively heavy casualties. As the author notes, "If the United States had experienced equivalent losses in the Vietnam War, it would have suffered 200,000 American dead - a figure four times the actual number." Given this situation, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat quickly proposed a negotiated peace, which a suddenly war-weary Israeli public warily accepted. Both as an incisive narrative of the 1973 war and an analysis of the self-deception and overconfidence that too decisive a victory can breed, "The 1973 Arab-Israeli War" is an invaluable work of scholarship as well as a cautionary tale for students and practitioners of modern warfare. Orginally published in 1996: 104 p. maps. ill.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory

Garwych, George W

Middle East

This conference investigates war termination, one of the most important issues facing military and political leaders as they use or contemplate the use of use of military force in the pursuit of national aims. Prompted by the Unified Quest Training and Leader Development theme and discussions about the use of history in training and leader development, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command and the United States Military Academy partnered on this war termination project and invited renowned military historians to provide their views on the subject. The study began with several seminars following Unified Quest in May of 2009. Each contributor provided a brief essay and presented their views on the topic at a War Termination Conference at West Point in June of 2010. These scholars represented a broad range of the American experience from the Revolutionary War to the first Gulf War. The assembled essays and interviews reflect the thoughts of these historians about America's wars, their concluding battles or final campaigns, and ultimately how they ended. While they provide no answers and no formula for successful war termination, they do provide thoughtful reflections from years of study and they suggest important implications for civilian and military decisionmakers today.

War Termination: The Proceedings of the War Termination Conference, United States Military Academy West Point

Politics & Social Sciences

Politics & Government

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