Restorative Just Culture in Practice: Implementation and Evaluation

A restorative just culture has become a core aspiration for many organizations in healthcare and elsewhere. Whereas ‘just culture’ is the topic of some residual conceptual debate (e.g. retributive policies organized around rules,violations and consequences are ‘sold’ as just culture), the evidence base on, and business case for, restorative practice has been growing and is generating increasing, global interest. In the wake of an incident, restorative practices ask who are impacted, what their needs are and whose obligation it is to meet those needs. Restorative practices aim to involve participants from the entire community in the resolution and repair of harms. 
This book offers organization leaders and stakeholders a practical guide to the experiences of implementing 
and evaluating restorative practices and creating a sustainable just, restorative culture. It contains the perspectives from leaders, theoreticians regulators, employees and patient representatives. To the best of our knowledge, there is no book on the market today that can function as a guide for the implementation and evaluation of a just and learning culture and restorative practices. This book is intended to fill this gap. This book will provide, among other topics, an overview of restorative just culture principles and practices; a balanced treatment of the various implementations and evaluations of just culture and restorative processes; a guide for leaders about what to stop, start, increase and decrease in their own organizations; and an attentive to philosophical and historical traditions and assumptions that underlie just culture and restorative approaches. 
The interest in ‘just culture’, not just in healthcare but also in other fields of safety-critical practice, has been steadily growing over the past decade. It is a trending area. In this, it has become clear that 20-year-old retributive models not only hinder the acceleration of performance and organizational improvement but have also in some cases become a blunt HR instrument, an expression of power over justice and a way to stifle honesty, reporting and learning. What is new in this, then, is the restorative angle on just culture, as it has been developed over the last few years and now is practised and applied to HR, suicide prevention, healthcareimprovement, regulatory innovations and other areas.

Business & Money

Dekker, Sidney

Rafferty, Joseph

Oates, Amanda

Industries

Productivity Press

The End of Heaven: Disaster and Suffering in a Scientific Age

In this unique book, Sidney Dekker tackles a largely unexplored dilemma. Our scientific age has equipped us ever better to explain why things go wrong. But this increasing sophistication actually makes it harder to explain why we suffer. Accidents and disasters have become technical problems without inherent purpose. When told of a disaster, we easily feel lost in the steely emptiness of technical languages of engineering or medicine. Or, in our drive to pinpoint the source of suffering, we succumb to the hunt for a scapegoat, possibly inflicting even greater suffering on others around us. How can we satisfactorily deal with suffering when the disaster that caused it is no more than the dispassionate sum of utterly mundane, imperfect human decisions and technical failures? Broad in its historical sweep and ambition, The End of Heaven is also Dekker's most personal book to date.

The End of Heaven

Parenting & Relationships

Routledge

In this unique book, Sidney Dekker tackles a largely unexplored dilemma. Our scientific age has equipped us ever better to explain why things go wrong. But this increasing sophistication actually makes it harder to explain why we suffer. Accidents and disasters have become technical problems without inherent purpose. When told of a disaster, we easily feel lost in the steely emptiness of technical languages of engineering or medicine. Or, in our drive to pinpoint the source of suffering, we succumb to the hunt for a scapegoat, possibly inflicting even greater suffering on others around us. How can we satisfactorily deal with suffering when the disaster that caused it is no more than the dispassionate sum of utterly mundane, imperfect human decisions and technical failures? Broad in its historical sweep and ambition, The End of Heaven is also Dekker's most personal book to date.

The Field Guide to Human Error Investigations

Accident investigators historically have used hindsight to look at where people went wrong to reconstruct the human contribution to system failure; Dekker suggests a different approach. Arguing that human error is systematically connected to aspects of people's tools and tasks, he suggests that understanding what went on in people's minds during an accident requires reconstructing the situation that the mind found itself in. His suggested methods, reminders, and pointers help investigators visualize how people's assessments and actions made sense at the time. Dekker (Link÷ping Institute of Technology, Sweden) is a cognitive systems engineer and pilot. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

Engineering & Transportation

Transportation

Ashgate Pub Ltd

This title was first published in 2002: This field guide assesses two views of human error - the old view, in which human error becomes the cause of an incident or accident, or the new view, in which human error is merely a symptom of deeper trouble within the system. The two parts of this guide concentrate on each view, leading towards an appreciation of the new view, in which human error is the starting point of an investigation, rather than its conclusion. The second part of this guide focuses on the circumstances which unfold around people, which causes their assessments and actions to change accordingly. It shows how to "reverse engineer" human error, which, like any other componant, needs to be put back together in a mishap investigation.

Politics & Social Sciences

Sociology

When faced with a human error problem, you may be tempted to ask 'Why didn't they watch out better? How could they not have noticed?'. You think you can solve your human error problem by telling people to be more careful, by reprimanding the miscreants, by issuing a new rule or procedure. These are all expressions of 'The Bad Apple Theory', where you believe your system is basically safe if it were not for those few unreliable people in it. This old view of human error is increasingly outdated and will lead you nowhere. The new view, in contrast, understands that a human error problem is actually an organizational problem. Finding a 'human error' by any other name, or by any other human, is only the beginning of your journey, not a convenient conclusion. The new view recognizes that systems are inherent trade-offs between safety and other pressures (for example: production). People need to create safety through practice, at all levels of an organization. Breaking new ground beyond its successful predecessor, "The Field Guide to Understanding Human Error" guides you through the traps and misconceptions of the old view. It explains how to avoid the hindsight bias, to zoom out from the people closest in time and place to the mishap, and resist the temptation of counterfactual reasoning and judgmental language. But it also helps you look forward. It suggests how to apply the new view in building your safety department, handling questions about accountability, and constructing meaningful countermeasures. It even helps you in getting your organization to adopt the new view and improve its learning from failure. So if you are faced by a human error problem, abandon the fallacy of a quick fix. Read this book.

The Field Guide to Understanding Human Error

Engineering

Ashgate Pub. Co

When faced with a human error problem, you may be tempted to ask 'Why didn't they watch out better? How could they not have noticed?'. You think you can solve your human error problem by telling people to be more careful, by reprimanding the miscreants, by issuing a new rule or procedure. These are all expressions of 'The Bad Apple Theory', where you believe your system is basically safe if it were not for those few unreliable people in it. This old view of human error is increasingly outdated and will lead you nowhere. The new view, in contrast, understands that a human error problem is actually an organizational problem. Finding a 'human error' by any other name, or by any other human, is only the beginning of your journey, not a convenient conclusion. The new view recognizes that systems are inherent trade-offs between safety and other pressures (for example: production). People need to create safety through practice, at all levels of an organization. Breaking new ground beyond its successful predecessor, The Field Guide to Understanding Human Error guides you through the traps and misconceptions of the old view. It explains how to avoid the hindsight bias, to zoom out from the people closest in time and place to the mishap, and resist the temptation of counterfactual reasoning and judgmental language. But it also helps you look forward. It suggests how to apply the new view in building your safety department, handling questions about accountability, and constructing meaningful countermeasures. It even helps you in getting your organization to adopt the new view and improve its learning from failure. So if you are faced by a human error problem, abandon the fallacy of a quick fix. Read this book.

Economics

CRC-Press

Just Culture: Balancing Safety and Accountability

A just culture protects people's honest mistakes from being seen as culpable. But what is an honest mistake, or rather, when is a mistake no longer honest? It is too simple to assert that there should be consequences for those who 'cross the line'. Lines don't just exist out there, ready to be crossed or obeyed. We - people - construct those lines; and we draw them differently all the time, depending on the language we use to describe the mistake, on hindsight, history, tradition, and a host of other factors. What matters is not where the line goes - but who gets to draw it. If we leave that to chance, or to prosecutors, or fail to tell operators honestly about who may end up drawing the line, then a just culture may be very difficult to achieve. The absence of a just culture in an organization, in a country, in an industry, hurts both justice and safety. Responses to incidents and accidents that are seen as unjust can impede safety investigations, promote fear rather than mindfulness in people who do safety-critical work, make organizations more bureaucratic rather than more careful, and cultivate professional secrecy, evasion, and self-protection. A just culture is critical for the creation of a safety culture. Without reporting of failures and problems, without openness and information sharing, a safety culture cannot flourish. Drawing on his experience with practitioners (in nursing, air traffic control and professional aviation) whose errors were turned into crimes, Dekker lays out a new view of just culture. This book will help you to create an environment where learning and accountability are fairly and constructively balanced.

Management & Leadership

A just culture protects people's honest mistakes from being seen as culpable. But what is an honest mistake, or rather, when is a mistake no longer honest? It is too simple to assert that there should be consequences for those who 'cross the line'. Lines don't just exist out there, ready to be crossed or obeyed. We-people-construct those lines; and we draw them differently all the time, depending on the language we use to describe the mistake, on hindsight, history, tradition, and a host of other factors.What matters is not where the line goes-but who gets to draw it. If we leave that to chance, or to prosecutors, or fail to tell operators honestly about who may end up drawing the line, then a just culture may be very difficult to achieve.The absence of a just culture in an organization, in a country, in an industry, hurts both justice and safety. Responses to incidents and accidents that are seen as unjust can impede safety investigations, promote fear rather than mindfulness in people who do safety-critical work, make organizations more bureaucratic rather than more careful, and cultivate professional secrecy, evasion, and self-protection. A just culture is critical for the creation of a safety culture. Without reporting of failures and problems, without openness and information sharing, a safety culture cannot flourish.Drawing on his experience with practitioners (in nursing, air traffic control and professional aviation) whose errors were turned into crimes, Dekker lays out a new view of just culture. This book will help you to create an environment where learning and accountability are fairly and constructively balanced.

Business Culture

Behind Human Error

Human error is cited over and over as a cause of incidents and accidents. The result is a widespread perception of a 'human error problem', and solutions are thought to lie in changing the people or their role in the system. For example, we should reduce the human role with more automation, or regiment human behavior by stricter monitoring, rules or procedures. But in practice, things have proved not to be this simple. The label 'human error' is prejudicial and hides much more than it reveals about how a system functions or malfunctions. This book takes you behind the human error label. Divided into five parts, it begins by summarising the most significant research results. Part 2 explores how systems thinking has radically changed our understanding of how accidents occur. Part 3 explains the role of cognitive system factors - bringing knowledge to bear, changing mindset as situations and priorities change, and managing goal conflicts - in operating safely at the sharp end of systems. Part 4 studies how the clumsy use of computer technology can increase the potential for erroneous actions and assessments in many different fields of practice. And Part 5 tells how the hindsight bias always enters into attributions of error, so that what we label human error actually is the result of a social and psychological judgment process by stakeholders in the system in question to focus on only a facet of a set of interacting contributors. If you think you have a human error problem, recognize that the label itself is no explanation and no guide to countermeasures. The potential for constructive change, for progress on safety, lies behind the human error label.

COOK, RICHARD

Woods, David

Johannesen, Leila

Sarter, Nadine

See the best price to sell, buy, or rent books by Dekker, Sidney. BookScouter helps to compare book prices from 25+ online bookstores and 30+ buyback vendors with a single search.

Books by Dekker, Sidney

See the best price to sell, buy, or rent books by Dekker, Sidney. BookScouter helps to compare book prices from 25+ online bookstores and 30+ buyback vendors with a single search.

Restorative Just Culture in Practice: Implementation and Evaluation

The End of Heaven

The End of Heaven: Disaster and Suffering in a Scientific Age

The Field Guide to Human Error Investigations

The Field Guide to Human Error Investigations

The Field Guide to Understanding Human Error

The Field Guide to Understanding Human Error

Just Culture: Balancing Safety and Accountability

Just Culture: Balancing Safety and Accountability

Behind Human Error