Principles of War: A Translation from the Japanese

History

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Combat Studies Institute

WEST, JOSEPH

Military

Independently published

This book examines Operation SEALORDS, the capstone campaign conducted by the Brown-Water Navy in Vietnam. Specifically, this paper addresses the primary question: Was the SEALORDS campaign successful, and if so, what lessons, can be learned from SEALORDS and how might we employ brown-water forces in the future? This book breaks down the SEALORDS campaign into three areas of study. First, the study examines the barrier interdiction portion of the campaign designed to stem the flow of enemy infiltration of men and material from Cambodia into the Mekong Delta. Second, this study analyzes the Denial of Sanctuary Operations and Pacification portion of the SEALORDS operations. Lastly, the Accelerated Turnover to the Vietnamese Program known as "ACTOV" is examined to determine its effectiveness. The Findings of this book suggest that by concentrating naval forces athwart the major infiltration routes along the Cambodian border, SEALORDS effectively cut enemy lines of communication into South Vietnam and severly restricted enemy attempts at infiltration. Additionally, the findings suggest that SEALORDS contributed significantly to pacification efforts in the southern part of III Corps and all of the TV Corps Tactical Zone. Finally, the ACTOV Program is evaluated as successful and put the navy out ahead of the other services with respect to Vietnamization of the war effort.

Operation Sealords: A Front in a Frontless War, An Analysis of the Brown-Water Navy in Vietnam

CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform

In a surprise move during the summer of 1955 the Secretary of the Navy selected Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke over 92 more senior admirals to become the Navy’s next Chief of Naval Operations. The junior admiral went on to serve an unprecedented three terms as the Navy’s principal leader, a record yet to be broken. With no formal leadership instruction aside from his Naval Academy days and abbreviated experience at the senior operational level, Burke nonetheless became a prolific strategic level leader. At the height of the Cold War Burke led the Navy through a transition in technology, moving from an era of bullets and propellers to one of guided missiles and jets. Under his watch nuclear propulsion became the standard for all US submarines while the Navy greatly enhanced its contribution to the nation’s strategic nuclear capability with nuclear missile submarines. In driving these transitions Burke left his mark on Navy culture and morale, shaking the service out of the doldrums and reinvigorating it. Today’s military leaders are required to deal with a large degree of ambiguity. Understanding how previous leaders dealt with complex issues may help current and future leaders understand how to deal with difficult issues effectively. It may also help leaders understand circumstances as they exist today by examining the visions and decisions of strategic leaders in the past.

Admiral Arleigh Burke - A Study in Strategic Leadership

Characterized by some authors as a rehearsal for the First World War, the Russo- Japanese War was arguably the world’s first modern war. During this war, the lethality of weapons on the 20th Century battlefield was clearly demonstrated. Recording the events of the Russo-Japanese War were military and civilian observers from every major power of the time. These observers wrote voluminous accounts of the war that clearly illustrated this new battlefield destructiveness. The research question of this thesis is what tactical lessons were available to the observer nations of the Russo-Japanese War that were not used in their preparations for World War I. This paper will look at both observer accounts of the war and professional journal articles written soon after the war to consider this question. To answer this question, the stationary Siege of Port Arthur and the maneuver Battle of Mukden are used as representative battles of this war. Reports from these two battles clearly demonstrate the lethality of modern warfare and foreshadow the combined effects of hand grenades mortars, machineguns, and field artillery in World War I.

The Russo-Japanese War, Lessons Not Learned

Asia

The primary question this thesis aims to answer is--did the Studies and Observation Group (SOG) covert and clandestine operations contribute significantly to the Vietnam War effort? The scope of research is an examination of SOG operations throughout the war. To determine SOG’s contributions, research will answer the following secondary and tertiary questions: (1) What were the US strategic, operational, and tactical goals for Vietnam and how did they develop? (2) Did SOG contribute to the accomplishment of strategic, operational, and tactical goals in the Vietnam War? and (3) How did SOG missions affect enemy forces and their operations?By answering the primary, secondary, and tertiary questions, a conclusion may be drawn concerning the contributions of SOG in Vietnam as the primary headquarters for carrying out the unconventional war effort against the North Vietnamese. Lessons learned may apply to the use of similar unconventional warfare assets in the Global War on Terrorism.

The Misuse of the Studies and Observation Group as a National Asset in Vietnam

After World War II the United States (U.S.) struggled to counter communist expansion by establishing a world order that fostered capitalism. Key to success in the Asian-Pacific region was rebuilding the Japanese economy as a capitalist power. Toward that end, the U.S. indirectly supported the French during the First Indochina War to recolonize and take advantage of the area's raw materials. The French failed and agreed in the Geneva Accords to partition the country with a goal of reunifying North and South Vietnam. The U.S. realized the Viet Minh would dominate and gain control of the country providing a communist victory in the region. Unwilling to accept this, the U.S. pressured Emperor Bao Dai to install Ngo Dinh Diem as Premier of South Vietnam. This was based in part on Diem and his family's Catholic heritage, which led to pressure from leaders in the U.S. who were either Catholic or sympathetic to the Catholic Church. Ultimately, influence from the Vietnamese Catholic Church, the American Catholic Church, and the Vatican would become a factor in the foreign policy decisions by the Eisenhower Administration as they related to Vietnam. These decisions led to direct involvement in Vietnam and eventually the Vietnam War.

The Influence of the Catholic Church on the Eisenhower Administration's Decision to Directly Intervene in Vietnam

1863 was the third year of the American Civil War. When the year began, the war was still largely unsettled. This was the case in the western theater, where the Union Army of the Cumberland faced the Confederate Army of Tennessee, vying for control of Tennessee and its valuable resources and strategic rail interchanges. In the early months of 1863 the Army of the Cumberland was resting and reorganizing. General William S. Rosecrans, commander of the Army of the Cumberland, resisted pressure from Washington to commence his spring offensive against General Braxton Bragg, commander of the Army of Tennessee. The strategic importance of Tennessee at that point in the war was three-fold. First, many Union loyalists lived in East Tennessee. President Lincoln wanted to liberate the state and bring those citizens back under the umbrella of Union control. Secondly, Confederate rail lines connecting the resources of the western theater to Virginia ran through Tennessee. Those rail lines served as lines of communication and lines of supplying the Confederate armies not only in Tennessee but throughout the Eastern Theater as well. Third, Tennessee was rich in supplies needed to sustain the Confederate war effort. Food items such as pork, corn and mineral resources such as copper and saltpeter, two ingredients of gunpowder, were mined in Tennessee.

The American Civil War: Wilder's Brigade in the Tullahoma and Chattanooga Campalgns

Americas

This study investigates the American Civil War role and contributions of Major General John Buford. Buford, a 1848 graduate of the United States Military Academy, began his Army career on America's frontier with the First United States Dragoons. With the outbreak of the Civil War, Buford was selected to command a cavalry brigade in John Pope's Army of Virginia, and participated in the Second Manassas Campaign. Buford went on to make significant contributions to the Union efforts in the Eastern Theater; however, history has generally portrayed Buford as a one-dimensional character based on his stand along McPherson and Seminary Ridges on the first day of the Battle of Gettysburg. Several historians have presumed that the dismounted cavalry (or Dragoon) tactics used by Buford at Gettysburg were the culmination of a method of fighting which he helped develop and propagate within the Union cavalry. However, this thesis shows that contrary to this Dragoon image, Buford was in fact a remarkable cavalry officer. His battlefield tactics were fairly traditional, but it was not in pitched battles that Buford excelled. His significant contributions were in the established roles of cavalry; performing reconnaissance and providing security for the army he was supporting.

The American Civil War: Dragoon or Cavalryman- Major General John Buford

failure was due to four factors: (1) a false British assumption of loyalist support among the local populace, (2) British application of self-defeating political and military policies, (3) the British failure to deploy sufficient forces to control the territory, and (4) patriot General Nathanael Greene’s campaign against British forces. The chapters that follow examine each of these factors in detail.In March 1778, King George III was eager to find a solution to what had become a political and military quagmire with the war in America. He established the Carlisle Peace Commission and dispatched the body to New York City with a proposal to cease hostilities. The American government insisted that the king and the British government agree to recognize American independence. The commission refused to make this concession and both parties recognized that they had arrived at an impasse.

The Failure of British Strategy During the Southern Campaign of the American Revolutionary War, 1780-81

This book examines the 7/7 London bombings, the Murrah building attack by Timothy McVeigh, and the Japanese religious terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo. The three groups are analyzed against the recognized forms of human rights, as defined by the United Nations agreement to which all three countries in the case studies are signatories. By analyzing the effect of human rights which exist and are protected in democratic societies against the acts of the terrorist groups and individuals in the case study, an analysis will be presented to ascertain if there are aspects of a democracy which shield the activities of possible homegrown terrorist groups inside the country.

Homegrown Terrorism Inside of Democratic States

Politics & Social Sciences

Politics & Government

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