In this classic work, John Steinbruner argues that the time is ripe for exploration of a new theoretical perspective on the decision-making process in government. He suggests that the cybernetic theory of decision as developed in such diverse fields as information theory, mathematical logic, and behavioral psychology generates a systematic but non-rational analysis that seems to explain quite naturally decisions that are puzzling when viewed from the rational perspective. When combined with the basic understanding of human mental operations developed in cognitive psychology, the cybernetic theory of decision presents a striking picture of how decision makers deal with the intense uncertainty and fundamental value conflicts that arise in bureaucratic politics. To illustrate the advantages of using cybernetic theory, Steinbruner analyzes the issue of sharing nuclear weapons among the NATO allies.

The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis

Computers & Technology

Steinbruner, John D.

Business Technology

Princeton University Press

In this classic work, John Steinbruner argues that the time is ripe for exploration of a new theoretical perspective on the decision-making process in government. He suggests that the cybernetic theory of decision as developed in such diverse fields as information theory, mathematical logic, and behavioral psychology generates a systematic but non-rational analysis that seems to explain quite naturally decisions that are puzzling when viewed from the rational perspective. When combined with the basic understanding of human mental operations developed in cognitive psychology, the cybernetic theory of decision presents a striking picture of how decision makers deal with the intense uncertainty and fundamental value conflicts that arise in bureaucratic politics. To illustrate the advantages of using cybernetic theory, Steinbruner analyzes the issue of sharing nuclear weapons among the NATO allies.

Business & Money

Management & Leadership

Among its many important effects, the political revolution in central Europe has provided a sharp reminder that international security is as much a state of mind as it is a physical condition. The threat of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, long hypothesized by Western defense ministries on the basis of a perceived imbalance in inherent conventional force capability, is now acknowledged to be a practical impossibility because shifts in political alignment have been credited. In the wake of that judgement, the force deployments themselves are virtually certain to be reduced, equalized, and disengaged, thereby removing firepower advantage as a threat to international stability. Moreover, though the intrinsic connection is remote, a similar judgement seems to be affecting global strategic deployments. As strategic forces are projected to be reduced to common ceilings by mutual agreement, the fear of preemptive attacks on theoretically vulnerable land-based installations appears to be receding more rapidly than the inherent capability that originally inspired it.This relief from the narrowly focused, obsessive fears that have dominated U.S. security policy for several decades is certainly a constructive development, but unfortunately it is not comprehensively valid. For strategic forces in particular, some subtle interaction between human judgement and physical capability remain potentially dangerous, presenting a security problem that will not be resolved simply by completing the projected agenda of national weapons development and international arms control agreements. The problem arises from conceivable combinations of events that are undoubtedly improbable but unprecedentedly catastrophic should any of them ever occur. The standards of safety that have evolved for improbable disasters of much smaller magnitude—nuclear reactor meltdown, for example—have been applied to only peacetime operations and have not been extended to the circumstances of advanced crisis or to the actual implications of combat operations. To appreciate the implications of this limitation and the dangers that emerge from it requires a substantial revision of standard perspectives on strategic security.

The Effects of Warning on Strategic Stability (Brookings Occasional Papers)

History

Blair, Bruce G.

Military

Brookings Institution Press

Kaufmann and Steinbruner take a close look at the most recent spending plan from the Pentagon, contending that the potential for greater cost reduction is possible. They offer alternatives for force reduction and future budgeting. After much debate in 1990, Congress and the administration agreed to reduce real spending for national defense by nearly 20% by fiscal 1996. To achieve these savings, the Defense Department proposes to cut US forces by approximately 25%, end procurement of most current-generation weapons, and prepare for the introduction of new capabilities after 1996. According to the authors, there is a huge probability that, as a consequence, real defense spending will then begin to rise. Kaufmann and Steinbruner question the merits of the assumptions on which this policy is based. They argue not only that the Pentagon has overstated the potential military threats of the future, but also that defense can reduce its forces and investments below what its spokesmen have described as "an irreducible minimum". To support their case, the authors indicate specifically the forces and budgets they consider appropriate for the next 10 years.

Decisions for Defense: Prospects for a New Order (Studies in Defense Policy)

Engineering & Transportation

Kaufmann, William W.

Engineering

Brookings Inst Pr

Principles of Global Security

From the earliest human records, warfare has been both an organizing focus and a prime source of political motivation. Countless battles have been fought in the course of colonizing the planet, and the experience has created a legacy of military confrontation that many people consider immutable. Since preparations for war and the occasional conduct of it have been central preoccupations for virtually all the major states throughout time, it is widely assumed that the pattern is rooted in human nature and will endure indefinitely. But contemporary civilization is undergoing a monumental transformation affecting its most basic features. The combined effects of information technology, population dynamics, and the globalization of economic activity are altering some of the critical operating conditions of human societies and appear to be inducing a new pattern of interaction. Correspondingly, fundamental changes in the practice of war-or what is now more politely called international security-can be expected to follow. Principles of Global Security anticipates the major implications of this massive transformation for security policy. John D. Steinbruner, one of the nation's leading specialists on defense issues, identifies formative problems and organizing principles relating to the predictable issues of security. He examines in sequence how the configuration of nuclear and conventional forces might be affected, how the problems of communal violence and dangers of technical proliferation might be managed, and how security relationships among the major states might be altered. One of the fundamental implications of globalization in a post-cold war environment is a shift in security policy from deterrence to reassurance, from active confrontation to cooperative engagement. Without an opponent to justify preparation for large-scale traditional missions, nations must establish safer and less volatile patterns of deployment. Maintaining global security in the twenty-first century calls for a reconfiguration of basic relationships among historical opponents, as well as revisions in military practices. This visionary work will stimulate productive thinking among policymakers seeking to reshape the legacies of the cold war with a new conceptualization of international security.

Politics & Social Sciences

Steinbruner, John A.

Politics & Government

At the moment, the revision of security policy and the formation of a new consensus to support it are still at an early stage of development. The idea of comprehensive security cooperation among the major military establishments to form an inclusive international security arrangement has been only barely acknowledged and is only partially developed. The basic principle of cooperation has been proclaimed in general terms in the Paris Charter issued in November of 1990. Important implementing provisions have been embodied in the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START), Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaties. Except for the regulation of U.S. and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) strategic forces, however, these arrangements apply only to the European theater and even there have not been systematically developed. The formation of a new security order requires that cooperative theaters of military engagement be systematically developed. Clearly that exercise will stretch the minds of all those whose thinking about security has been premised on confrontational methods.Nonetheless, such a stretching is unavoidable. The new security problems are driven by powerful forces, reshaping the entire international context. They impose starkly different requirements. They will deflect even the impressive momentum of U.S. military traditions. The eventual outcome is uncertain. It turns upon political debates yet to be held, consensus judgements yet to form, and events and their implications yet to unfold. Fundamental reconceptualization of security policy is a necessary step in the right direction, and it is important to get on with it. Getting on with it means defining the new concept of cooperative security, identifying the trends that motivate it, outlining its implications for practical policy action, and acknowledging its constraints. These tasks are the purpose of this essay.

A New Concept of Cooperative Security (Brookings Occasional Papers)

Carter, Ashton B.

Perry former United States Secretary of Defense, William J.

There’s been an apparent terrorist attack on a government laboratory that has been conducting controversial experiments using the smallpox virus. Professor David Turner is surreptitiously tasked by a wary president to investigate the incident independent of a formal commission appointed for the purpose. The assignment makes him an emissary to a powerful watchdog organization that provides indispensable assets but also subjects him to their scrutiny. Seeking to assure his independence, David enlists an American student with Iranian parentage to help him weigh evidence that Iran was responsible for the attack. He also develops an increasingly consequential relationship with an aide to the President assigned to monitor his project. As he struggles with his assignment under the pressure of politically ominous and potentially violent threat, he taps the deeper currents of global politics and personal relationships. Not able to disentangle his own fate from the outcome of the investigation, he encounters the ambiguities and dangers but also the liberating qualities of truth.

The Secular Monastery

Literature & Fiction

Genre Fiction

Createspace Independent Pub

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