What determines the size and form of redistributive programs, the extent and type of public goods provision, the burden of taxation across alternative tax bases, the size of government deficits, and the stance of monetary policy during the course of business and electoral cycles? A large and rapidly growing literature in political economics attempts to answer these questions. But so far there is little consensus on the answers and disagreement on the appropriate mode of analysis.
Combining the best of three separate traditions -- the theory of macroeconomic policy, public choice, and rational choice in political science -- Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini suggest a unified approach to the field. As in modern macroeconomics, individual citizens behave rationally, their preferences over economic outcomes inducing preferences over policy. As in public choice, the delegation of policy decisions to elected representatives may give rise to agency problems between voters and politicians. And, as in rational choice, political institutions shape the procedures for setting policy and electing politicians. The authors outline a common method of analysis, establish several new results, and identify the main outstanding problems.

Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy (Zeuthen Lectures) (Zeuthen Lecture Book Series)

Business & Money

Persson, Torsten

Tabellini, Guido Enrico

Economics

Mit Pr

The Economic Effects of Constitutions (Munich Lectures in Economics)

The authors of The Economic Effects of Constitutions use econometric tools to study what they call the "missing link" between constitutional systems and economic policy; the book is an uncompromisingly empirical sequel to their previous theoretical analysis of economic policy. Taking recent theoretical work as a point of departure, they ask which theoretical findings are supported and which are contradicted by the facts. The results are based on comparisons of political institutions across countries or time, in a large sample of contemporary democracies. They find that presidential/parliamentary and majoritarian/proportional dichotomies influence several economic variables: presidential regimes induce smaller public sectors, and proportional elections lead to greater and less targeted government spending and larger budget deficits. Moreover, the details of the electoral system (such as district magnitude and ballot structure) influence corruption and structural policies toward economic growth.Persson and Tabellini's goal is to draw conclusions about the causal effects of constitutions on policy outcomes. But since constitutions are not randomly assigned to countries, how the constitutional system was selected in the first place must be taken into account. This raises challenging methodological problems, which are addressed in the book. The study is therefore important not only in its findings but also in establishing a methodology for empirical analysis in the field of comparative politics.

What lessons does the current economic crisis in Sweden offer for other economies? Written in a clear and precise style and using modern theories of macroeconomics and economic policy to analyze Sweden's serious economic situation, Turning Sweden Around outlines recommendations for change that are both unusual and provocative. Combining economic and political analysis it covers wide-ranging areas and broad structural issues that encompass the necessity for institutional reforms as well as economic change.The plunge in Sweden's economy has taken many by surprise, showing how much more vulnerable Sweden has been to macroeconomic disturbance than previously believed. Since 1990 industrial output has fallen dramatically, total unemployment has grown to 12 percent, the public sector deficit is 13 percent of GDP, and since the country shifted to a floating exchange rate last fall, the krona has depreciated by more than 20 percent.The authors identify the deficiencies of Sweden's economic and political institutions, and suggest remedies that cut across virtually all aspects of economic and political life: product and factor markets, the system of wage formation, the public sector, and central and local government. They show that many of the current problems stem from an unclear division of responsibilities, describing a government that has taken on so many tasks that it is unable to fulfill its core obligations. Three chapters tackle the basic problems in the Swedish economy -- stability, efficiency, and growth -- while a fourth chapter suggests how to change the political system to strengthen democracy.

Turning Sweden Around

Molander, Per

Lindbeck, Assar

MIT Press]

What determines the size and form of redistributive programs, the extent and type of public goods provision, the burden of taxation across alternative tax bases, the size of government deficits, and the stance of monetary policy during the course of business and electoral cycles? A large and rapidly growing literature in political economics attempts to answer these questions. But so far there is little consensus on the answers and disagreement on the appropriate mode of analysis.
Combining the best of three separate traditions―the theory of macroeconomic policy, public choice, and rational choice in political science―Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini suggest a unified approach to the field. As in modern macroeconomics, individual citizens behave rationally, their preferences over economic outcomes inducing preferences over policy. As in public choice, the delegation of policy decisions to elected representatives may give rise to agency problems between voters and politicians. And, as in rational choice, political institutions shape the procedures for setting policy and electing politicians. The authors outline a common method of analysis, establish several new results, and identify the main outstanding problems.

Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy (Zeuthen Lectures)

Literature & Fiction

Tabellini, Guido

Dramas & Plays

The MIT Press

The authors of The Economic Effects of Constitutions use econometric tools to study what they call the "missing link" between constitutional systems and economic policy; the book is an uncompromisingly empirical sequel to their previous theoretical analysis of economic policy. Taking recent theoretical work as a point of departure, they ask which theoretical findings are supported and which are contradicted by the facts. The results are based on comparisons of political institutions across countries or time, in a large sample of contemporary democracies. They find that presidential/parliamentary and majoritarian/proportional dichotomies influence several economic variables: presidential regimes induce smaller public sectors, and proportional elections lead to greater and less targeted government spending and larger budget deficits. Moreover, the details of the electoral system (such as district magnitude and ballot structure) influence corruption and structural policies toward economic growth.Persson and Tabellini's goal is to draw conclusions about the causal effects of constitutions on policy outcomes. But since constitutions are not randomly assigned to countries, how the constitutional system was selected in the first place must be taken into account. This raises challenging methodological problems, which are addressed in the book. The study is therefore important not only in its findings but also in establishing a methodology for empirical analysis in the field of comparative politics.

"Little else is required to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things." So wrote Adam Smith a quarter of a millennium ago. Using the tools of modern political economics and combining economic theory with a bird's-eye view of the data, this book reinterprets Smith's pillars of prosperity to explain the existence of development clusters--places that tend to combine effective state institutions, the absence of political violence, and high per-capita incomes.
 To achieve peace, the authors stress the avoidance of repressive government and civil conflict. Easy taxes, they argue, refers not to low taxes, but a tax system with widespread compliance that collects taxes at a reasonable cost from a broad base, like income. And a tolerable administration of justice is about legal infrastructure that can support the enforcement of contracts and property rights in line with the rule of law. The authors show that countries tend to enjoy all three pillars of prosperity when they have evolved cohesive political institutions that promote common interests, guaranteeing the provision of public goods. In line with much historical research, international conflict has also been an important force behind effective states by fostering common interests. The absence of common interests and/or cohesive political institutions can explain the existence of very different development clusters in fragile states that are plagued by poverty, violence, and weak state capacity.

Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters (The Yrjö Jahnsson Lectures)

Besley, Timothy

Princeton University Press

The European Union faces difficult challenges: to go on with further enlargement; to reconcile radically different views on the appropriate scope and depth of integration; and to close the democratic deficit and revive public support for the Union. Written by a distinguished team of academics from six countries to inform public opinion before the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, CEPR's sixth Monitoring European Integration Report argues for significant economic, political and legal reforms of the Union to meet these challenges. Flexible Integration is a model of reform designed to overcome the current stalemate between federalists and anti-federalists. It introduces more flexibility to accommodate the heterogeneous interests in Europe without risking the gains achieved through past integration. Flexible integration combines firm commitment by all members to a common supranational common base - including a well-defined set of competences related to the Single Market - with optional integration in other areas through open partnerships. Within these ramifications, the report discusses a number of specific reforms, including: how to introduce a hierarchy of European Law, making the Union's legal structure more flexible and transparent; how to improve enforcement of the Single Market, realising the vision underlying the four freedoms; how to achieve macroeconomic coordination without the tarnished exchange rate mechanism, while accommodating the different views on the single currency; and how to make political decision-making more efficient and legitimate, representing and balancing different European interests and making decision-makers more directly accountable to the citizens of Europe.

Flexible Integration: Towards a More Effective and Democratic Europe (Monitoring European Integration, No 6)

Rosenthal, Howard

Roland, Gérard

Dewatripont, Mathias

Giavazzi, Francesco

Harden, Ian

Hagen, Jurgen Von

Sapir, Andre

Centre for Economic Policy Research

Almost a year after the European Central Bank (ECB) officially "opened for business," this second major report in the Monitoring European Central Bank series provides a detailed analysis of the ECB's actions and alerts the public to the main issues raised by the policies pursued by the ECB during its first year. Written by a team of distinguished economists known internationally for their work on macroeconomics, the report also provides an assessment of the key issues facing European monetary policy.

One Money, Many Countries 2000: Monitoring the European Central Bank 2

Freixas, Xavier

Begg, David

Favero, Carlo

Wyplosz,Charles

Grauwe, Paul De

Uhlig, Harald

Below is a list of the prizewinners during the period 1996 - 2000 with a description of the works which won them their prizes: (1996) J A MIRRLEES &amp; W S VICKREY -- for their fundamental contributions to the economic theory of incentives under asymmetric information; (1997) R C MERTON &amp; M A SCHOLES -- for a new method to determine the value of derivatives; (1998) A K SEN -- for his contributions to welfare economics; (1999) R A MUNDELL -- for his analysis of monetary and fiscal policy under different exchange rate regimes and his analysis of optimum currency areas; (2000) J J HECKMAN -- for his development of theory and methods for analyzing selective samples &amp; D L McFADDEN -- for his development of theory and methods for analyzing discrete choice.

NOBEL LECTURES IN ECONOMIC SCIENCES, VOL 4 (1996-2000)

World Scientific Publishing Company

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