Integral to Xi Jinping’s vision of restoring China to greatness—what he defines as the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” [zhonghua minzu weida fuxing, 中华民族伟大复兴]—is building a more modern, capable, and disciplined military. China’s economic development, territorial integrity, and even the survival of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself cannot be guaranteed without an army that can fight and prevail in modern warfare. Articulating the need for a stronger military, Xi and his colleagues have reflected on periods of Chinese weakness, such as the era of imperial decline in the late 19th century and the Japanese occupation in the 1930s and 1940s. In Xi’s words, a “nation’s backwardness in military affairs has a profound influence on a nation’s security. I often peruse the annals of modern Chinese history and feel heartbroken at the tragic scenes of us being beaten because of our ineptitude.” Such humiliations, in his view, should never be repeated.Xi’s ambition to reshape and modernize the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been apparent from his early days as CCP general secretary and Central Military Commission (CMC) chairman. At the third plenum of the 18th Party Congress, held in October 2013, Xi and other Party elites declared their intention to overhaul the military’s command structure, update its training and logistics systems, adjust the size and composition of the services, unveil new rules and regulations governing military personnel, and strengthen civil-military cooperation in technological development and other areas.2 In early 2014, Xi assumed leadership of a leading group on military reform, symbolizing his central role in the process. At the group’s first meeting, Xi declared that “national defense and military reform are an important part and an important symbol of China’s overall reform,” noting that the overriding goal was to produce a military that can “fight and win battles.”

Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms

History

National Defense University Press

Military

Independently published

On the morning of September 28, 1991, then-Colonel Frank Klotz witnessed an historic moment at Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota. As he and other senior officers from the base bomber and missile units watched, the crews for the B-1 strategic bombers that had been on alert that day climbed into their cockpits, started the planes, and taxied one after another away from the alert aircraft parking area. That scene was repeated at all 11 Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases in the United States. By the end of the day, there were no U.S. bombers on alert for the first time in over 30 years. Although the numbers varied over time, a significant portion of U.S. strategic bombers had been on continuous alert since 1957: fully fueled, loaded with weapons, with crews in a special nearby area--ready to launch in a few minutes. On September 28, 1991, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney signed an Execute Order to end that practice immediately. It has never resumed.

The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992

Politics & Social Sciences

Koch, Susan

Politics & Government

One of Chinese president Xi Jinping's signature foreign policy programs is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a web of infrastructure development plans designed to increase Eurasian economic integration. Chinese official rhetoric on the BRI focuses on its economic promise and progress, often in altruistic terms: all countries have been invited to board this "express train" to wealth and prosperity.1 Missing from the rhetoric is much discussion of the initiative's security dimensions and implications. Chinese officials avoid describing the strategic benefits they think the BRI could produce, while also gliding over major security risks and concerns. Yet at the unofficial level, China's security community has paid close attention to these issues, probing in great depth the gains Beijing can expect, the challenges it will face, and the new demands it will have to satisfy.This study finds that Chinese security perspectives on the BRI are fundamentally ambivalent. On one hand, the thinking goes, economic development and connectivity will help stabilize China's border regions, secure its energy supplies, and allow China to extend its strategic influence. On the other hand, China will face various challenges, ranging from terrorism to strategic competition from the United States, Japan, and India. Meeting these challenges requires careful diplomatic coordination and messaging, a stronger ability to anticipate and assess risk, and new capabilities to protect trade routes and Chinese citizens abroad. For the United States, evidence from Chinese sources supports the need for caution about Beijing's intentions, but also highlights areas of potential cooperation to the extent that both countries share complementary regional agendas.Following a brief background section, the study surveys the Chinese literature in three main parts: the first covers strategic drivers, the second covers key operational and strategic challenges, and the third part focuses on the range of new requirements. The final section provides overarching thoughts about the discourse and discusses implications for the United States.

Chinese Perspectives on the Belt and Road Initiative: Strategic Rationales, Risks, and Implications

Wuthnow, Joel

Entering the Air Force's Active-duty force in 1955, the eight-engine B-52 "Stratofortress," dubbed "BUFF" by its crewmembers,8 was an aerial behemoth with a wingspan almost twothirds the length of a football field and designed to deliver nuclear bombs. The bomber displayed America's aerial might at the height of the Cold War, with crews alternating between flying airborne alert missions with nuclear ordnance and serving "ground alert" with nuclear-laden bombers capable of takeoff 15 minutes after notification. The airborne alert missions, which had begun in 1960, ended in January 1968, but ground alerts endured throughout the Vietnam War. The B-52 force remained a key component of America's nuclear triad, which also consisted of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear missile-carrying submarines.A crew of six operated the bomber: a pilot (the aircraft commander) and copilot, both responsible for flying the aircraft and conducting in-flight refueling as needed; a radar-navigator, responsible for bombing and generally the most experienced navigator onboard; a navigator, responsible for guiding the aircraft throughout its mission; an electronic warfare officer, also a navigator and responsible for defending the aircraft from surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) by jamming the signals they received from ground-operated sites; and an enlisted gunner, responsible for defending the aircraft from fighter attack with four .50-caliber radar-guided machine guns located in the tail of the aircraft. In all models of the B-52, the pilot occupied the left seat in the cockpit, while the copilot sat in the right seat, and the electronic warfare officer, dubbed "EWO" or "EW" on most crews, sat facing rearward behind the pilot and copilot. The navigator and radar-navigator sat in a cramped, windowless compartment underneath the cockpit nicknamed the "black hole" and connected to the cockpit above by a ladder. In the F and D model B52s, employed most frequently in the Vietnam War, the gunner sat 150 feet behind the cockpit in the rear of the aircraft underneath its enormous tail in a small, windowed enclosure; in the G model aircraft, which began flying in war in 1972, the gunner sat facing rearward next to the EWO. An intercom system enabled all members of the crew to talk to one another, and when they communicated, they usually identified themselves by their crew position: "pilot," "copilot," "radar," "nav," "EWO," and "guns." The EWO taped those conversations for postmission debriefs. During lulls in the flights--a mission from Guam to South Vietnam and back took over 12 hours--the EWO or another crewman might play music over the system.

Fifty Shades of Friction: Combat Climate, B-52 Crews, and the Vietnam War

Clodfelter, Mark

Presents revised and edited papers from a October 2010 conference held in Taipei on the Chinese Air Force. The conference was jointly organized by Taiwan’s Council for Advanced Policy Studies, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the U.S. National Defense University, and the RAND Corporation. This books offers a complete picture of where the Chinese air force is today, where it has come from, and most importantly, where it is headed.

The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities

Engineering & Transportation

HALLION, Richard P.

Cliff, Roger G.

Engineering

CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform

A first of its kind, this book—of, by, and for the noncommissioned officer and petty officer—is a comprehensive explanation of the enlisted leader across the U.S. Armed Services. It complements The Armed Forces Officer, the latest edition of which was published by NDU Press in 2007, as well as the Services’ NCO/PO manuals and handbooks. Written by a team of Active, Reserve, and retired senior enlisted leaders from all Service branches, this book defines and describes how NCOs/POs fit into an organization, centers them in the Profession of Arms, explains their dual roles of complementing the officer and enabling the force, and exposes their international engagement. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin E. Dempsey writes in his foreword to the book, “We know noncommissioned officers and petty officers to have exceptional competence, professional character, and soldierly grit—they are exemplars of our Profession of Arms.” Aspirational and fulfilling, this book helps prepare young men and women who strive to become NCOs/POs, re-inspires serving enlisted leaders, and stimulates reflection by those who have retired from or left active service. It also gives those who have never worn the uniform a better understanding of who these exceptional men and women are, and why they are properly known as the “Backbone of the Armed Forces.”

The Noncommissioned Officer and Petty Officer: Backbone of the Armed Forces

Dempsey, Martin E.

Battaglia, Bryan B.

This volume represents an early attempt at assessing the Long War, now in its 14th year. Forged in the fires of the 9/11 attacks, the war includes campaigns against al Qaeda, major conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and operations in the Horn of Africa, the Republic of the Philippines, and globally, in the air and on the sea. The authors herein treat only the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, the largest U.S. efforts. It is intended for future senior officers, their advisors, and other national security decision makers. By derivation, it is also a book for students in joint professional military education courses, which will qualify them to work in the field of strategy. While the book tends to focus on strategic decisions and developments of land wars among the people, it acknowledges that the status of the United States as a great power and the strength of its ground forces depend in large measure on the dominance of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force in their respective domains.

Lessons Encountered : Learning from the Long War

American logistics in World War II was "big" by just about any measure one can devise. There is no question that it played a dominant role in the allied victory and thereby shaped the history of the rest of the century. The lessons of that achievement, consequently, remain essential today, especially for those who study and work with the resources component of United States grand strategy. So it is important that those lessons be accurate, that they portray a balanced view, pointing out shortcomings as well as documenting great successes; otherwise, a mythologized picture of the "Arsenal of Democracy" may be perpetuated. It was in this spirit that the Industrial College of the Armed Forces convened a symposium to address the lessons of World War II logistics--"the Big L."The extended essays published here began as papers delivered at the symposium, then were expanded and revised for this book. Written by faculty of the Industrial College, they address the massive subject from seven perspectives: industrial mobilization; acquisition of war materials; the economics of mobilization; the building of infrastructure; the Lend-Lease program; joint logistics in the Pacific Theater; and joint logistics--the "materiel battle "--in Europe. The American effort--mind-boggling as it was in sheer numbers--was flawed in many respects. With the advantage of hindsight, the authors take a hard, unsentimental look at these areas of WWII logistics and offer a balanced analysis that will best serve our understanding of this subject.It is particularly appropriate that this book is a product of the Industrial College because ICAF is a unique institution--the only senior military college in the world dedicated to comprehensive study of the resources component of national security.

The Big L: American Logistics in World War II

Gropman, Alan L.

Mercenaries are more powerful than experts realize, a grave oversight. Those who assume they are cheap imitations of national armed forces invite disaster because for-profit warriors are a wholly different genus and species of fighter. Private military companies such as the Wagner Group are more like heavily armed multinational corporations than the Marine Corps. Their employees are recruited from different countries, and profitability is everything. Patriotism is unimportant, and sometimes a liability. Unsurprisingly, mercenaries do not fight conventionally, and traditional war strategies used against them may backfire.

Mercenaries and War: Understanding Private Armies Today

McFate, Sean

Criminal Law

Reviews of this study on leadership include: "Beau Puryear has written a brilliant and insightful account of Marine Corps generalship. He has truly captured the essence of what the Corps values in its senior leaders. It is a humbling honor to be included in this superb work. This is a must-read for all those who want to understand Marine Corps leadership and why it is so respected." - General (Ret.) Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (Ret.). "This book is the best treatise on leadership, and all the characteristics that make it up, that I've ever read. It will be a bestseller in the Marine Corps, and beyond that-and will create in our sister Service members who read it an even greater envy that they didn't choose the Marine Corps. By drawing directly from the experiences of those who have led, Beau Puryear has offered the reader page after page of "how tos." I wish I had had access to this book when I was 25 years old. Whatever else I did in my years in the Corps would have been a quantum leap greater because of the lessons culled from leaders a hell of a lot more effective than me." - General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., USMC (Ret.).

Marine Corps Generalship

Business & Money

Puryear, Edgar F.

Management & Leadership

Military Bookshop

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