The Economy As An Evolving Complex System

Arrow, Kenneth J.

Pines, David

Anderson, Philip W.

Santa Fe Instit

Science & Math

Basic Books

The journal Econometrica is the locus of some of the most important and advanced contributions to modern economics, and a new series of books has been established, the better to preserve and disseminate the cream of these contributions. Each volume presents a selection of articles covering a broad aspect of the field. This second volume in the series closely follows publication of the first, Selected Readings in Econometrics from Econometrica. Joseph E. Stiglitz is General Editor of the series. The editor of the present volume has chosen the 22 articles reprinted here in such a way as to point up the general utility of economic theory and the widely distributed range of specific problems that can be analyzed and clarified with its application. Among the topics covered by these selected readings are the distribution of national income, entrepreneurial and consumer demand theories, the stability of equilibrium (including competitive equilibrium), the bargaining problem, resource utilization, the nature of the expectation and planning horizon, utility discrimination, social welfare functions, separable utility and aggregation, risk aversion, and two-level planning. The contributors are M. Kalecki; A. Wald; Louis M. Court; Paul A. Samuelson; Rene Roy; Wassily Leontief; George B. Dantzig; John F. Nash, Jr.; Gerard Debreu; Franco Modigliani and Franz E. Hohn; M. Boiteux; R. Duncan Luce; Julian H. Blau; Kenneth J. Arrow, H. D. Block, and Leonid Hurwicz; W. M. Gorman; Lionel W. McKenzie; Frank H. Hahn and Takashi Negishi; Robert J. Aumann; Tjalling C. Koopmans, Peter A. Diamond, and Richard E. Williamson; John H. Pratt; and J. Kornai and Th. Liptak.

Selected Readings in Economic Theory from Econometrica

Business & Money

Economics

Mit Pr

Social Choice and Individual Values.

Politics & Social Sciences

Social Sciences

Yale Univ Pr

Originally published in 1951, Social Choice and Individual Values introduced “Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem” and founded the field of social choice theory in economics and political science. This new edition, including a new foreword by Nobel laureate Eric Maskin, reintroduces Arrow’s seminal book to a new generation of students and researchers.\n"Far beyond a classic, this small book unleashed the ongoing explosion of interest in social choice and voting theory. A half-century later, the book remains full of profound insight: its central message, ‘Arrow’s Theorem,’ has changed the way we think.”—Donald G. Saari, author of Decisions and Elections: Explaining the Unexpected

Social Choice and Individual Values, Second edition (Cowles Foundation Monographs Series)

Yale University Press

Originally published in 1951, Social Choice and Individual Values introduced “Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem” and founded the field of social choice theory in economics and political science. This new edition, including a new foreword by Nobel laureate Eric Maskin, reintroduces Arrow’s seminal book to a new generation of students and researchers.
"Far beyond a classic, this small book unleashed the ongoing explosion of interest in social choice and voting theory. A half-century later, the book remains full of profound insight: its central message, ‘Arrow’s Theorem,’ has changed the way we think.”—Donald G. Saari, author of Decisions and Elections: Explaining the Unexpected

Social Choice and Individual Values (Cowles Foundation Monographs Series)

The Rational Foundations of Economic Behaviour: Proceedings of the Iea Conference Held in Turin, Italy (IEA CONFERENCE VOLUME)

Comprises 14 papers presented to a conference of the IEA held in Turin, Italy. Contributions are divided into four areas of theoretical and empirical developments: rational choice and associated problems of logic; rationality as explained by game theory; experiments to elucidate rational behavior; and alternative treatments of rationality in decision-making theory. Includes a preface by Nobel Laureate Kenneth J. Arrow tracing the evolution of concepts of economic rationality from the start of this century. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

PALGRAVE~MACMILLAN

The tension between what we wish for and what we can get, between values and opportunities, exists even at the purely individual level. A hermit on a mountain may value warm clothing and yet be hard-pressed to make it from the leaves, bark, or skins he can find. But when many people are competing with each other for satisfaction of their wants, learning how to exploit what is available becomes more difficult. In this volume, Nobel Laureate Kenneth J. Arrow analyzes why - and how - human beings organize their common lives to overcome the basic economic problem: the allocation of scarce resources. The price system is one means of organizing society to mediate competition, and Arrow analyzes its successes and failures. Alternative modes of achieving efficient allocation of resources are explored: government, the internal organization of the firm, and the 'invisible institutions' of ethical and moral principles. Professor Arrow shows how these systems create channels to make decisions, and discusses the costs of information acquisition and retrieval. He investigates the factors determining which potential decision variables are recognized as such. Finally, he argues that organizations must achieve some balance between the power of the decision makers and their obligation to those who carry out their decisions - between authority and responsibility.

The Limits of Organization (Fels Lectures on Public Policy Analysis)

W.W.Norton&Company

General Competitive Analysis (Volume 12) (Advanced Textbooks in Economics, Volume 12)

Hahn, F.H.

North-Holland

Unlike the papers of some other great economists, those of Kenneth Arrow are being read and studied today with even greater care and attention than when they first appeared in the journals. The publication of his collected papers will therefore be welcomed by economists and other social scientists and in particular by graduate students, who can draw from them the deep knowledge and the discernment in selection of scientific problems that only a master can offer. The author has added headnotes to certain well-known papers, describing how he came to write them.
In this first volume, Arrow takes up the basic question of whether collective choices can be made in such a way as to reflect individual preferences. The seminal 1950 paper that opens the volume shows that given certain reasonable conditions that social choices must satisfy to reflect individual preferences, it is impossible to make a choice among all sets of alternatives without violating some of the conditions. The subsequent papers extend, deepen, and clarify these results and examine the concept of justice, both in the abstract and in economic models. The volume also contains searching critiques of the theories of justice of John Rawls and Robert Nozick.

Social Choice and Justice (Volume 1) (Collected Papers of Kenneth J. Arrow)

Belknap Press: An Imprint of Harvard University Press

Unlike the papers of some other great economists, those of Kenneth Arrow are being read and studied today with even greater care and attention than when they first appeared in journals. This publication of his collected papers, to be completed in seven topical volumes, will be welcomed by economists and other social scientists and in particular by graduate students, who can draw from them the deep knowledge and taste in the selection of scientific problems that only a master can offer.
This volume is concerned with the foundations of neo-classical economic analysis. General equilibrium is a theory of prices in which all of the actions of the economic agents in an economy are determined simultaneously and in a decentralized fashion. The price system, determined in competitive markets, guides actions for both firms and individual consumers. All of the complex interrelations of the economy are distilled into the determination of this price system.
In these papers, Arrow examines the conditions under which such a price system would exist. He also clarifies the conditions under which the system can or cannot achieve an optimum. In the latter case, when “market failures” are present, he shows the role of a benevolent government in helping to overcome the induced inefficiencies.

General Equilibrium (Volume 2) (Collected Papers of Kenneth J. Arrow)

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