Being We: Phenomenological Contributions to Social Ontology

Politics & Social Sciences

Zahavi, Dan

Philosophy

Oxford University Press

Can you be a self on your own or only together with others? Is selfhood a built-in feature of experience or rather socially constructed? How do we at all come to understand others? Does empathy amount to and allow for a distinct experiential acquaintance with others, and if so, what does that tell us about the nature of selfhood and social cognition? Does a strong emphasis on the first-personal character of consciousness prohibit a satisfactory account of intersubjectivity or is the former rather a necessary requirement for the latter? Engaging with debates and findings in classical phenomenology, in philosophy of mind and in various empirical disciplines, Dan Zahavi's new book Self and Other offers answers to these questions. Discussing such diverse topics as self-consciousness, phenomenal externalism, mindless coping, mirror self-recognition, autism, theory of mind, embodied simulation, joint attention, shame, time-consciousness, embodiment, narrativity, self-disorders, expressivity and Buddhist no-self accounts, Zahavi argues that any theory of consciousness that wishes to take the subjective dimension of our experiential life serious must endorse a minimalist notion of self. At the same time, however, he also contends that an adequate account of the self has to recognize its multifaceted character, and that various complementary accounts must be integrated, if we are to do justice to its complexity. Thus, while arguing that the most fundamental level of selfhood is not socially constructed and not constitutively dependent upon others, Zahavi also acknowledges that there are dimensions of the self and types of self-experience that are other-mediated. The final part of the book exemplifies this claim through a close analysis of shame.

Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame

Dan Zahavi offers an in-depth and up-to-date analysis of central and contested aspects of the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology.\nWhat is ultimately at stake in Husserl's phenomenological analyses? Are they primarily to be understood as investigations of consciousness or are they equally about the world? What is distinctive about phenomenological transcendental philosophy, and what kind of metaphysical import, if any, might it have? Husserl's Legacy offers an interpretation of the more overarching aims and ambitions of Husserlian phenomenology and engages with some of the most contested and debated questions in phenomenology. Central to its interpretative efforts is the attempt to understand Husserl's transcendental idealism. Zahavi argues that Husserl was not a sophisticated introspectionist, not a phenomenalist, nor an internalist, not a quietist when it comes to metaphysical issues, and not opposed to all forms of naturalism. Husserl's Legacy argues that Husserl's phenomenology is as much about the world as it is about consciousness, and that a proper grasp of Husserl's transcendental idealism reveals the 
fundamental importance of facticity and intersubjectivity.

Husserl's Legacy: Phenomenology, Metaphysics, and Transcendental Philosophy

The Oxford Handbook of the History of Phenomenology (Oxford Handbooks)

This Oxford Handbook offers a broad critical survey of the development of phenomenology, one of the main streams of philosophy since the nineteenth century. It comprises thirty-seven specially written chapters by leading figures in the field, which highlight historical influences, connections and developments, and offer a better comprehension and assessment of the continuity as well as diversity of the phenomenological tradition.Thisvolume will be a source of insight for philosophers, students of philosophy, and for people working in other disciplines of the humanities, social sciences, and sciences, who are interested in thephenomenological tradition. It is an authoritative guide to how phenomenology started, how it developed, and where it is heading.

Dan Zahavi offers an in-depth and up-to-date analysis of central and contested aspects of the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology. What is ultimately at stake in Husserl's phenomenological analyses? Are they primarily to be understood as investigations of consciousness or are they equally about the world? What is distinctive about phenomenological transcendental philosophy, and what kind of metaphysical import, if any, might it have? Husserl's Legacy offers an interpretation of the more overarching aims and ambitions of Husserlian phenomenology and engages with some of the most contested and debated questions in phenomenology. Central to its interpretative efforts is the attempt to understand Husserl's transcendental idealism. Husserl's Legacy argues that Husserl was not an internalist, nor a quietist when it comes to metaphysical issues; that he assigned a fundamental importance to facticity and intersubjectivity; and that he was not opposed to all forms of naturalism.

What is a self? Does it exist in reality or is it a mere social construct -- or is it perhaps a neurologically induced illusion? The legitimacy of the concept of the self has been questioned by both neuroscientists and philosophers in recent years. Countering this, in Subjectivity and Selfhood, Dan Zahavi argues that the notion of self is crucial for a proper understanding of consciousness. He investigates the interrelationships of experience, self-awareness, and selfhood, proposing that none of these three notions can be understood in isolation. Any investigation of the self, Zahavi argues, must take the first-person perspective seriously and focus on the experiential givenness of the self. Subjectivity and Selfhood explores a number of phenomenological analyses pertaining to the nature of consciousness, self, and self-experience in light of contemporary discussions in consciousness research.
Philosophical phenomenology -- as developed by Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others -- not only addresses crucial issues often absent from current debates over consciousness but also provides a conceptual framework for understanding subjectivity. Zahavi fills the need -- given the recent upsurge in theoretical and empirical interest in subjectivity -- for an account of the subjective or phenomenal dimension of consciousness that is accessible to researchers and students from a variety of disciplines. His aim is to use phenomenological analyses to clarify issues of central importance to philosophy of mind, cognitive science, developmental psychology, and psychiatry. By engaging in a dialogue with other philosophical and empirical positions, says Zahavi, phenomenology can demonstrate its vitality and contemporary relevance.

Subjectivity And Selfhood: Investigating the First-person Perspective (A Bradford Book)

Bradford Books

What is a self? Does it exist in reality or is it a mere social construct―or is it perhaps a neurologically induced illusion? The legitimacy of the concept of the self has been questioned by both neuroscientists and philosophers in recent years. Countering this, in Subjectivity and Selfhood, Dan Zahavi argues that the notion of self is crucial for a proper understanding of consciousness. He investigates the interrelationships of experience, self-awareness, and selfhood, proposing that none of these three notions can be understood in isolation. Any investigation of the self, Zahavi argues, must take the first-person perspective seriously and focus on the experiential givenness of the self. Subjectivity and Selfhood explores a number of phenomenological analyses pertaining to the nature of consciousness, self, and self-experience in light of contemporary discussions in consciousness research.
Philosophical phenomenology―as developed by Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others―not only addresses crucial issues often absent from current debates over consciousness but also provides a conceptual framework for understanding subjectivity. Zahavi fills the need―given the recent upsurge in theoretical and empirical interest in subjectivity―for an account of the subjective or phenomenal dimension of consciousness that is accessible to researchers and students from a variety of disciplines. His aim is to use phenomenological analyses to clarify issues of central importance to philosophy of mind, cognitive science, developmental psychology, and psychiatry. By engaging in a dialogue with other philosophical and empirical positions, says Zahavi, phenomenology can demonstrate its vitality and contemporary relevance.

Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective

Humor & Entertainment

MIT Press]

The Phenomenological Mind

The Phenomenological Mind, Third Editionintroduces fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. One of the outstanding books in the field, now translated into eight languages, this highly regarded exploration of phenomenology from a topic-driven standpoint examines the following key questions and issues: <ul> <li>what is phenomenology?</li> <li>phenomenology and the cognitive sciences</li> <li>consciousness and self-consciousness</li> <li>time and consciousness</li> <li>intentionality and perception</li> <li>the embodied mind</li> <li>action</li> <li>knowledge of other minds</li> <li>situated and extended minds</li> <li>phenomenology and personal identity.</li> </ul> This third edition has been revised and updated throughout. The chapter on phenomenological methodologies has been significantly expanded to cover qualitative research and there are new sections discussing important, recent research on topics including phenomenology and emotion, social cognition, race and gender, collective intentionality and selfhood. Also included are helpful features such as chapter summaries, guides to further reading, and a glossary, making The Phenomenological Mind, Third Edition anideal introduction to key concepts in phenomenology, cognitive science and philosophy of mind.

Gallagher, Shaun

Routledge

The Phenomenological Mind is the first book to properly introduce fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. Key questions and topics covered include: <ul>
<li>• what is phenomenology?</li> <li>• naturalizing phenomenology and the cognitive sciences</li> <li>• phenomenology and consciousness</li> <li>• consciousness and self-consciousness</li> <li>• time and consciousness</li> <li>• intentionality</li> <li>• the embodied mind</li> <li>• action</li> <li>• knowledge of other minds</li> <li>• situated and extended minds</li> <li>• phenomenology and personal identity.</li>
</ul> This second edition includes a new preface, and revised and improved chapters. Also included are helpful features such as chapter summaries, guides to further reading, and a glossary, making The Phenomenological Mind an ideal introduction to key concepts in phenomenology, cognitive science and philosophy of mind.

See the best price to sell, buy, or rent books by Zahavi, Dan. BookScouter helps to compare book prices from 25+ online bookstores and 30+ buyback vendors with a single search.

Books by Zahavi, Dan

See the best price to sell, buy, or rent books by Zahavi, Dan. BookScouter helps to compare book prices from 25+ online bookstores and 30+ buyback vendors with a single search.

Being We: Phenomenological Contributions to Social Ontology

Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame

Husserl's Legacy: Phenomenology, Metaphysics, and Transcendental Philosophy

The Oxford Handbook of the History of Phenomenology (Oxford Handbooks)

Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame

Husserl's Legacy: Phenomenology, Metaphysics, and Transcendental Philosophy

Subjectivity And Selfhood: Investigating the First-person Perspective (A Bradford Book)

Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective

The Phenomenological Mind

The Phenomenological Mind