The Possibility of Practical Reason

The Possibility of Practical Reason explores the foundational questions of moral psychology: How can any of our behaviour qualify as acting for a reason? How can any considerations qualify as reasons for us to act? David Velleman argues that both possibilities depend on there being a constitutive aim of action - something that makes for success in action as such, in the same way that truth makes for success in belief. Considerations qualify as reasons for acting by virtue of their relevance to the constitutive aim; and our behavior qualifies as acting for a reason when it responds to such considerations in pursuit of the aim. The eleven papers that make up this book (two of them previously unpublished) discuss such topics as the relation between value and practical reasoning, the foundations of decision theory, freedom of the will, shared intention, and the motivational role of the imagination.

Politics & Social Sciences

Velleman, J. David

Philosophy

Oxford University Press

The Possibility of Practical Reason explores the foundational questions of moral psychology: How can any of our behavior qualify as acting for a reason? How can any considerations qualify as reasons for us to act? David Velleman argues that both possibilities depend on there being a constitutive aim of action--something that makes for success in action as such. These eleven essays discuss such topics as the relation between value and practical reasoning, the foundations of decision theory, freedom of the will, shared intention, and the motivational role of the imagination.

How We Get Along

In How We Get Along, philosopher David Velleman compares our social interactions to the interactions among improvisational actors on stage. He argues that we play ourselves-not artificially but authentically, by doing what would make sense coming from us as we really are. And like improvisational actors, we deal with one another in dual capacities: both as characters within the social drama and as players contributing to the shared performance. In this conception of social intercourse, Velleman finds rational grounds for morality, though not a rational guarantee. He maps a middle course between skepticism and rationalism, arguing that practical reasoning is "pro-moral' without requiring moral action. The result is what he calls a "Kinda Kantian metaethics". Written in an accessible and engaging style, How We Get Along is the summation of Velleman's thinking to date, incorporating and unifying previous work on agency, the self, the emotions, narrative, and Kantian moral theory.

Cambridge University Press

Self to Self: Selected Essays

This book brings together essays on personal identity, autonomy, and moral emotions by the distinguished philosopher J. David Velleman. Although each of the essays was written as an independent piece, they are unified by an encompassing thesis, that there is no single entity denoted by "the self," as well as by themes from Kantian ethics, psychoanalytic theory, social psychology, and Velleman's work in the philosophy of action. Two of the essays were selected by the editors of Philosophers' Annual as being among the ten best papers in their year of publication.

A moral philosopher's meditations on some of life's most important questions We've all had to puzzle over such profound matters as birth, death, regret, free will, agency, and love. How might philosophy help us think through these vital concerns? In On Being Me, renowned moral philosopher J. David Velleman presents a concise, accessible, and intimate exploration into subjects that we care deeply about, offering compelling insights into what it means to be human. Each of Velleman's short, personal chapters begins with a theme: "Being Glad I Was Born," "Wanting to Go On," "Fearing the End," "Regretting What Might Have Been," "Aspiring to Authorship," "Making Things Happen," and "Wanting to Be Loved." Reflecting on how daily life presents us with thorny riddles that need working out, Velleman arrives at unexpected conclusions about survival and personal identity, the self and its future, time and morality, the rationality of regret, free will and personal efficacy, and goodness and love. He shows that we can rely on our own powers of thought to arrive at a better understanding of the most fundamental parts of ourselves--and that the methods of philosophy can help get us there. Beautifully illustrated by New Yorker contributing artist Emily Bernstein, On Being Me invites us to approach life philosophically.

On Being Me: A Personal Invitation to Philosophy

Princeton University Press

“What do you see when you look at your face in the mirror?” asks J. David Velleman in introducing his philosophical theory of action. He takes this simple act of self-scrutiny as a model for the reflective reasoning of rational agents: our efforts to understand our existence and conduct are aided by our efforts to make it intelligible. Reflective reasoning, Velleman argues, constitutes practical reasoning. By applying this conception, Practical Reflection develops philosophical accounts of intention, free will, and the foundation of morals. This new edition of Practical Reflection contains the original 1989 text along with a new introduction and is the latest entry in The David Hume Series of Philosophy and Cognitive Science Reissues, which keeps in print previously published indispensable works in the area of cognitive science.

Practical Reflection (The David Hume Series)

Center for the Study of Language and Information

The "Possibility of Practical Reason" explores the foundational questions of moral psychology: How can any of our behaviour qualify as acting for a reason? How can any considerations qualify as reasons for us to act? David Velleman argues that both possibilities depend on there being a constitutive aim of action - something that makes for success in action as such, in the same way that truth makes for success in belief. Considerations qualify as reasons for acting by virtue of their relevance to the constitutive aim; and our behavior qualifies as acting for a reason when it responds to such considerations in pursuit of the aim. The eleven papers that make up this book (two of them previously unpublished) discuss such topics as the relation between value and practical reasoning, the foundations of decision theory, freedom of the will, shared intention, and the motivational role of the imagination.

Scholarly Publishing Office, University of Michigan Library

The Possibility of Practical Reason explores the foundational questions of moral psychology: How can any of our behavior qualify as acting for a reason? How can any considerations qualify as reasons for us to act? David Velleman argues that both possibilities depend on there being a constitutive aim of action?something that makes for success in action as such. These twelve essays?five of which were not included in the previous edition, two of them previously unpublished?discuss topics such as freedom of the will, shared intention, the relation between value and practical reasoning, the foundations of decision theory, and the motivational role of the imagination.

Maize Books

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Books by Velleman, J. David

See the best price to sell, buy, or rent books by Velleman, J. David. BookScouter helps to compare book prices from 25+ online bookstores and 30+ buyback vendors with a single search.

The Possibility of Practical Reason

The Possibility of Practical Reason

How We Get Along

Self to Self: Selected Essays

Self to Self: Selected Essays

How We Get Along

On Being Me: A Personal Invitation to Philosophy

Practical Reflection (The David Hume Series)

The Possibility of Practical Reason

The Possibility of Practical Reason