Three Capitals for Two States: Analysis of Jerusalem’s Sovereignty and Perspectives

Politics & Social Sciences

United States Army Command and General Staff College

Politics & Government

CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform

This book explores two major U.S. operations and the reaction to one enemy offensive, in order to explore evidence of U.S. operational art in Vietnam. For the purpose of this study, the operational level is identified as the corps headquarters responsible for nesting Military Assistance Command–Vietnam’s ( MACV) military guidance, the strategic direction issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the national government’s aims with the tactical maneuver of subordinate divisions and battalions. During the Vietnam War, the Field Force served as the equivalent of the corps headquarters. The three case studies analyzed are all drawn from II Field Force during the period 1967 to 1971. These case studies are OPERATION CEDAR FALLS/ JUNCTION CITY (1967), the 1970 U.S. incursion into Cambodia under OPERATION TOAN THANG, and II Field Force’s reaction to the Tet offensive (1968). Through the analysis of the case studies, the question of operational art existing at the corps level during the Vietnam War is addressed, as is the identification of successful or unsuccessful leadership and staff practices faced in an asymmetric conflict.

Corps Level Operational Art in Vietnam: A Study of II Field Force Commanders During Major Named Operations

History

Military

Concentrating on the Enemy: The Transformation Under-fire of Former Regime Militias into Post-Conflict Guerrillas

The Transformation of the Army of the Potomac Staff From 1862-1864

Americas

National militaries extend operational reach through the use of improved lines of communication and basing. Evidence of Roman roads and fortifications in Gaul reveals a history of physical infrastructure extending operational reach in order to increase the Roman Army’s chance of success. Three case studies provide a framework for this study. First, Caesar’s legions used Gallic folkways to fight in Gaul from 58-50 BC. Second, the Romans projected all forces for the invasion of Britain over roads in Gaul in 43 AD. Third, from 19 BC until the fall of Rome in the fifth century AD, along the Germanic frontier. All three periods of Roman operations in Gaul demonstrate the interplay of the components of operational reach. Poor roads and basing restricted Caesar’s potential operational reach in Gaul. The deployment toward Britain over Roman roads in Gaul succeeded due to significant increases in infrastructure. On the static frontiers of the Roman empire, the army greatly reduced the potential momentum of its forces as a trade-off for greater endurance and protection.

Roman Roads in Gaul: How Lines of Communication and Basing Support Operational Reach

Ancient Civilizations

Osama bin Laden and Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri enticed tens of thousands of Muslims from around the world to travel to Afghanistan, swear allegiance to bin Laden and the cause of Al Qaeda, fight and even die for that cause. Bin Laden united faithful Muslims under his ideological banner by making relevant the historical context of authentic Islam and promoting jihad not only as a religious obligation, but a legally sanctioned and moral responsibility of every good and true Muslim. This monograph explains Al Qaeda's narrative as a jihadist organization that currently poses the greatest threat to United States and Western interests around the world. The first section offers an explanation of terms that people commonly use to describe an enemy they may not fully understand – these terms include fundamentalist, extremist, Salafi and jihadi. The next section provides a historical overview of the threat the United States faces in Afghanistan today. After explaining the roots of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, the paper details the organization's ideology and goals as well as the historical basis for this ideology, reaching back to the Prophet Muhammad and the origins of Islam. The paper argues that in order to defeat bin Laden and Al Qaeda, it is necessary to understand the roots of Al Qaeda's Islamic narrative and the environmental context that allowed these concepts to gain such a following. By understanding the true nature of the threat, United States political and military leaders will be better able to formulate plans and develop operations that counter the effectiveness of Al Qaeda's messages and provide alternatives for those currently engaged in jihad against America.

Toward Greater Understanding: The Jihadist Ideology of Al Qaeda

Operations in Afghanistan frequently require United States ground forces to engage and destroy the enemy at ranges beyond 300 meters. While the infantryman is ideally suited for combat in Afghanistan, his current weapons, doctrine, and marksmanship training do not provide a precise, lethal fire capability to 500 meters and are therefore inappropriate. Comments from returning soldiers reveal that about fifty percent of engagements occur past 300 meters. Current equipment, training, and doctrine are optimized for engagements under 300 meters and on level terrain. This monograph reviews the small arms capability of the infantry squad from World War I to present. It then discusses current shortfalls with cartridge lethality, weapons and optics configurations, the squad designated marksman concept and finally the rifle qualification course. Potential solutions in each of these areas are discussed.

Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afghanistan: Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer

This study examines what effect unit culture has on leadership practices in the 75th Ranger Regiment. The study investigates how the unit culture of the 75th Ranger Regiment developed; and through a survey questionnaire administered to selected leaders in the 75th Ranger Regiment, it explores prevailing views on the effect unit culture has on leadership practices.This study reveals that, first, executive leaders are more likely than mid-level leaders to delegate actions to lower levels of the unit. Secondly, mid-level leaders are likely to identify and eliminate soldiers who cannot meet established standards. Finally, mid-level leaders are likely to risk new methods to achieve mission accomplishment. These leadership practices demonstrate characteristics of an adaptive or learningorganization. First, leaders are willing to decentralize control in order to increase motivation and initiative. Second, leaders feel a sense of personal mastery that drives them to uphold shared values. Finally, leaders are not risk adverse and believe in being proactive problem solvers.

Organizational Culture and Leadership Practices in the 75th Ranger Regiment

This unclassified study evaluates the intelligence support the Army received from national intelligence agencies during JUST CAUSE and the Gulf War by using the seven characteristics of intelligence quality found in Joint Pub 2-0. The new national military strategy anticipates a less defined threat than during the Cold War. Also, downsizing pressures will proportionately reduce national and service intelligence support to the combatant CINCs and the services. This situation will require the Army to rely more than ever on national reconnaissance to support its warfighting intelligence needs.  A review of the Gulf War and JUST CAUSE indicates that although national intelligence has the capability to answer many tactical and operational reconnaissance questions, it generally fails to do so. The reasons are that national intelligence is focused to serve senior government policy makers not warfighters. National intelligence products are often caveated by differing analytic assessments that in effect are either ill-suited or cause confusion for tactical commanders. Finally, joint doctrine did not clearly set out coordination procedures or the process by which national reconnaissance is transmitted to tactical users in a timely manner.

National Reconnaissance Support to the Army

This thesis examines the generalship, leadership, and operational art of General James N. Mattis, US Marine Corps by using Task Force 58 in Afghanistan as a formative base and then comparing elements of operational art to the conduct of the 1st Marine Division in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003. Mattis draws upon many historical influences that shape his operational design in both campaigns. He puts great effort and focus on ensuring that his commander’s intent is understood by all his subordinates and uses a preference for a small staff in the planning and execution of his intent. He makes heavy use of personally selected liaison officers to form and sustain habitual relationships with higher and adjacent units. Through the use of historical examples and a refusal to be constrained by doctrine and popular thought he uses innovative approaches in his design. These innovative approaches often constitute paradigm shifts with contemporary thought and doctrine. A ‘Mattis Way of War’ is postulated in the conclusion which draws from his use of history, commander’s intent, and leadership to build up a capacity, or potential energy, for action in his unit. Once built up, he unleashes this energy utilizing explicit trust in his staff and subordinates.

The Mattis Way of War: An Examination of Operational Art in Task Force 58 and 1st Marine Division

See the best price to sell, buy, or rent books by United States Army Command and General Staff College. BookScouter helps to compare book prices from 25+ online bookstores and 30+ buyback vendors with a single search.

Books by United States Army Command and General Staff College