Aristotle's Favorite Tragedy: Oedipus or Cresphontes?

The Poetics is considered to be the foundation of Western dramatic and literary theory, and readers generally interpret Aristotle on the basis of Chapter 13 to claim that Oedipus, with its pity, fear and horrible ending, is the finest type of tragedy. Some specialists, however, discuss Aristotle also stating in Chapter 14 that the happily-ending plays like Cresphontes and Iphigenia (in Tauris) are the finest, with the type of plays that involve an agent killing or committing great suffering to a family member, and only recognizing the family connection afterwards, being second-best. This passage obviously creates a dilemma, because the second-best type must include Oedipus. No commentator has ever been able to resolve the dilemma to the satisfaction of the profession, and as a result Oedipus maintains its stature. Indeed, the specialist Elizabeth Belfiore recently published (“The Elements of Tragedy,” in A Companion to Aristotle, ed. Georgios Anagnostopoulos, 2009) a defense of the view that Oedipus is the best play for Aristotle in spite of the explicit ranking of Chapter 14.
Gregory Scott here demonstrates instead that Aristotle actually means what he says in Chapter 14: Tragoidos, originally “goat-song” or the like, and typically translated misleadingly as “tragedy,” really involves for him serious drama primarily about good people, and Aristotle says three times in the book that it can end in misfortune or in fortune. Scott, building on his ground-breaking work from 2003, “Purging the Poetics” (Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy) that is reprinted in his Aristotle on Dramatic Musical Composition: The Real Role of Literature, Catharsis, Music and Dance in the POETICS (2016), also resolves the dilemma between Chapters 13 and 14 once and for all, showing that the latter half of Chapter 14 is about tragoidos in general while the earlier text is only about one or two (or a mixture) of the subclasses of tragoidos as given in Chapter 18 and rarely discussed by commentators: “tragedy” of suffering, complex “tragedy,” “tragedy” of character, and simple/spectacular “tragedy.” The chapters are arbitrary divisions from the Renaissance and the texts must have both come from different original treatises of Aristotle and been assembled badly after his death, or the texts were part of a much larger work, now lost, in which the rest of the theory and the transitions from one topic to another were delineated.
In addition to resolving the perennial dilemma and shining a better light on Aristotle’s notion of “tragedy,” Scott also explains why the best type of play like Cresphontes is better than the second-best one, when they both have recognition and reversal, the conditions for the best kind of plot for Aristotle. With all of this in place, we can easily detect another dilemma that rarely gets discussed in the ranking of the four types of “tragedy” in Chapter 14: The third best type, which is not problematic in this context, involves an agent who knows someone is a family member and who kills the member anyway; we can easily deduce Medea is an example. However, all known commentators seem to accept that Aristotle speaks of Sophocles’ horribly-ending Antigone when he exemplifies the worst of the four types. Yet the reason Aristotle gives for the last-place finish is that Antigone is both apathes, “without suffering,” and miaron, “shocking” or “revolting.” Scott explains in detail not only that Aristotle must be speaking of Euripides’ version of Antigone, which ends happily, but why its last-place ranking results.

Literature & Fiction

Scott, Gregory L.

Dramas & Plays

ExistencePS

Generations of readers have taken Oedipus to be Aristotle’s paradigmatic tragedy, based on Poetics 13, where Aristotle says a moderately good man who makes a mistake (hamartia) is the cause of pity and fear. Yet in Chapter 14 Aristotle explicitly states that the type of play which must include Oedipus is second-best, after the type ending happily, including Cresphontes and Iphigenia (in Tauris). No specialist has ever been able to resolve this inconsistency to the satisfaction of the profession.
In this book, Scott demonstrates that for Aristotle Chapter 14’s ranking is truly the most important one for "tragedy" in general. ("Tragedy" has been the translation for generations for tragoidos, which on standard accounts originally meant "goat-song.") Scott is able to accomplish this because his recent ground-breaking work on the Poetics provides him with a unique vantage point. That is, in 2003 (Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy) he extended the arguments of M.D. Petruševski, who himself in 1954 argued that Aristotle could not have written the word katharsis in the definition of tragedy (in Chapter 6). Scott gave in 2003 the basic reasons why Aristotle also could not have written the words pity and fear in the definition because then they should belong to all tragedy and yet they do not even come close to belonging to most tragedies given Aristotle's own words. Having those conditions in the definition would be like having "blonde-haired" in the definition of man. In this book, Scott supplements those arguments in order to resolve the dilemma of the inconsistent ranking of plots. Aristotle also says that four (of the nine) plot-types in Chapters 13 and 14 have no pity, and we can easily deduce that four others, including the two that end happily (the double-structured plot of Chapter 13 and the favorite plot-type of Chapter 14), also have no relevant pity. Pity (and fear) only apply in those chapters to plots like Oedipus.
Given other considerations, by the end of the book we can understand that Oedipus is only one (or a mixture of two) of the very rarely discussed sub-types of tragedy mentioned in Chapter 18, whereas Chapter 14 is about tragedy in general. All of this easily resolves the dilemma of the inconsistent rankings, and shows that for Aristotle, unlike for modern audiences, tragoidos is serious drama that can–and even in its paradigmatic general form–does end happily. 
 In addition, Scott resolves a number of related problems, demonstrating, for example, that the Antigone given as the worst type of play in the Chapter 14 ranking must be the lost version of Euripides that ends joyfully, with Haemon marrying Antigone. One reason is that Aristotle says the play has no suffering (apathes). This is all contrary to the received tradition, in which commentators assume that Aristotle means the version by Sophocles that ends horribly with much suffering, that is, with multiple suicides.
This is the second edition. For changes, see page x for "Note on the 2nd edition." In short, except for one clarification regarding the play Oedipus versus the type of play that includes Oedipus, none of the content has changed. Rather, corrections have been implemented with respect to some typography, formatting, misplaced references, and formalization of abbreviations.

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This book revolutionizes the 1000-year old tradition that stems from the first commentaries on the Poetics by the Arabic scholars. Aristotle’s treatise has always been thought to be about poetic-literary theory, with tragedy being its paradigm. Scott demonstrates, however, that Aristotle (c. 384-322 BCE) employs poiesis not in the way universally assumed until now, as “language in verse” or “poetry,” which the sophist Gorgias only coined in 415 BCE. Rather, Aristotle follows Diotima, who in the Symposium of Plato (c. 424-347) explains poiesis as mousike kai metra (typically “‘music’ and verses”). One reason Aristotle employs the Diotiman and not the Gorgian sense of poiesis is that not one poem exists in the so-called “Poetics”; another reason is that the definition of tragedy includes “music.”
Scott subsequently demonstrates that Aristotle considers tragedy not to be a species of literature but one of dramatic musical theater that also requires dance and spectacle. Chapter 2 includes a revised version of Scott’s “The Poetics of Performance: The Necessity of Performance, Spectacle, Music, and Dance in Aristotelian Tragedy” (Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
The book also supplements his arguments of “Purging the Poetics” (Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 2003), reprinted here as Chapter 5, and provides the additional, and seemingly insuperable, reasons why Aristotle could not have written the clause with the words catharsis, pity, and fear in the definition of tragedy, as a number of internationally known ancient Greek specialists have already been accepting. As part of his reasons, Scott shows that, despite their very admirable paleography, Leonardo Tarán and Dmitri Gutas too often mangle the philosophical interpretations and even some of the philology regarding the “musical” terms, especially when they try to sweep the problems of catharsis under the rug. They claim in their recent Editio Maior (2012) that “The text of the passage [the word katharsis in Chapter 6] is not in dispute, though its interpretation is… The context and the agreement of B [one of the two extant Greek manuscripts] and SIGMA [the basis of the Syro-Arabic tradition] leave no doubt as to what Aristotle wrote.” However, many scholars dispute the text. Also, Tarán and Gutas never even recognize the Diotiman sense of poiesis that Aristotle uses, nor do they recognize the philosophical contradictions with keeping the katharsis-clause. They also downplay the relevance of A, the least corrupted Greek manuscript.
All of this allows a fresh and better reading of the treatise that even with its fundamental misinterpretations has been the foundation of Western literary, dramatic and artistic theory.
Contents
Volume 1 includes: Plato’s meanings of poiesis as “music-dance and verse” and his use of rhuthmos often not as “rhythm” but “dance”; the importance of dance in the state for Plato; Aristotle’s agreement with his mentor on the meaning of the musical terms and the requirement of dance not only in the Poetics but in the Politics, along with the proof that Aristotle considers tragedy to be a species of dramatic "musical" art, not literature. 
Volume 2 is available at: https://www.amazon.com/dp/099970494X
It includes the issues of catharsis, pity, and fear, and a complete rebuttal of the only attempted rigorous reply (by Stephen Halliwell in Between Ecstasy and Truth, 2011) to “Purging the Poetics.” This volume also contains: Aristotle's response to Plato without catharsis; comedy; whether or not the principles of "musical" dramatic theater can be applied to art forms like literature and cinema; history of the Poetics with regards to the two fundamental misconceptions; Bibliography; and Index for both volumes.
Volume 2 available at: https://www.amazon.com/dp/099970494X

Aristotle on Dramatic Musical Composition: The Real Role of Literature, Catharsis, Music and Dance in the POETICS

This book revolutionizes the 1000-year old tradition that stems from the first commentaries on the Poetics by the Arabic scholars. Aristotle’s treatise has always been thought to be about poetic-literary theory, with tragedy being its paradigm. Scott demonstrates, however, that Aristotle (c. 384-322 BCE) employs poiesis not in the way universally assumed until now, as “language in verse” or “poetry,” which the sophist Gorgias only coined in 415 BCE. Rather, Aristotle follows Diotima, who in the Symposium of Plato (c. 424-347) explains poiesis as mousike kai metra (typically “‘music’ and verses”). One reason Aristotle employs the Diotiman and not the Gorgian sense of poiesis is that not one poem exists in the so-called “Poetics”; another reason is that the definition of tragedy includes “music.”\nScott subsequently demonstrates that Aristotle considers tragedy not to be a species of literature but one of dramatic musical theater that also requires dance and spectacle. In short, in look, Ancient Greek "tragedy" was most similar to our modern serious Broadway musical. Chapter 2 includes a revised version of Scott’s “The Poetics of Performance: The Necessity of Performance, Spectacle, Music, and Dance in Aristotelian Tragedy” (Cambridge University Press, 1999).\nThe book also supplements his arguments of “Purging the Poetics” (Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 2003), reprinted here as Chapter 5, and provides the additional, and seemingly insuperable, reasons why Aristotle could not have written the clause with the words catharsis, pity, and fear in the definition of tragedy, as a number of internationally known ancient Greek specialists have already been accepting.\nAll of this allows a fresh and better reading of the treatise that even with its fundamental misinterpretations has been the foundation of Western literary, dramatic and artistic theory. 
Contents\nVolume 1 includes: Plato’s meanings of poiesis as “music-dance and verse” and his use of rhuthmos often not as “rhythm” but “dance”; the importance of dance in the state for Plato; Aristotle’s agreement with his mentor on the meaning of the musical terms and the requirement of dance not only in the Poetics but in the Politics, along with the proof that Aristotle considers tragedy to be a species of dramatic "musical" art, not literature.\nVolume 1 is available at https://www.amazon.com/dp/0999704923\nVolume 2 includes the issues of catharsis, pity, and fear, and a complete rebuttal of the only attempted rigorous reply (by Stephen Halliwell in Between Ecstasy and Truth, 2011) to “Purging the Poetics.” This volume also contains: Aristotle's response to Plato without catharsis; comedy; whether or not the principles of "musical" dramatic theater can be applied to art forms like literature and cinema; history of the Poetics with regards to the two fundamental misconceptions; Bibliography; and Index for both volumes.

Aristotle's Unmoved Mover of Metaphysics Lambda, often called God, still convinces some non-believers to become theists, despite its paradoxical nature. One recent case is the British philosopher, Antony Flew, co-author of There is a God: How the World's Most Notorious Atheist Changed His Mind (2007). As Pure Actuality, the Mover has no potentiality, matter or physicality of any sort whatsoever and exists forever, with no potential therefore of not existing. It somehow guarantees the existence of the universe that could disappear but, because of the Mover, does not. Moreover, It thinks of itself thinking, always, like a hyper-intellectual Narcissus. With derision, Cicero rejected the doctrine; Franz Brentano (1838-1917), a teacher of Sigmund Freud and Edmund Husserl, called it "prattle without all sense and reason"; and Werner Jaeger (1888-1961), a renowned specialist of Aristotle, demonstrated that the Northern Greek from Stagira evolved as he matured, helping explain discrepancies in various manuscripts. However, none of these thinkers provided for Aristotle the reasons the universe would not vanish without an Unmoved Mover. Scott does. All specialists know that the Stagirite accepted the infinite past. This book demonstrates that he also held the Principle of Plenitude-"for infinite things, what may be, is" (Physics III 4). Since every possibility has already been fulfilled in past time and since the infinitely-existing universe still persists, Aristotle concludes in Metaphysics Theta 8 that there is no fear that the heavens will ever stop moving. For additional reasons based on a profound understanding of necessity and possibility, he holds that this eternal motion is necessary, without any recourse to the Mover. Necessary eternal motion therefore supplants Aristotle's youthful doctrine of Pure Actuality, all of which solves another perennial problem in ancient Greek philosophy. The later Peripatetics, including Theophrastus, never embraced Pure Actuality and indeed, like the other later schools of philosophy, subsequently never even cared to discuss what is for later metaphysicians such an important doctrine. Scott's interpretation finally explains this, because the youthful, discarded doctrine was only revived 500 years later, with the commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias, who does not recognize Aristotle's truly mature view and who thereby muddies the theological waters to this day.

Aristotle’s “Not to Fear” Proof for the Necessary Eternality of the Universe

Politics & Social Sciences

Philosophy

Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover of Metaphysics Lambda, often called God, still convinces some non-believers to become theists, despite its paradoxical nature. One recent case is the British philosopher, Antony Flew, co-author of There is a God: How the World’s Most Notorious Atheist Changed His Mind (2007). As Pure Actuality, the Mover has no potentiality, matter or physicality of any sort whatsoever and exists forever, with no potential therefore of not existing. It somehow guarantees the eternal existence of the contingent universe that could disappear but, because of the Mover, does not. Moreover, It thinks of itself thinking, always, like a hyper-intellectual Narcissus.
With derision, Cicero rejected the doctrine; Franz Brentano (1838-1917), a teacher of Sigmund Freud and Edmund Husserl, called it “prattle without all sense and reason”; and Werner Jaeger (1888-1961), a renowned specialist of Aristotle, asserted that the philosopher from Stagira in Northern Greece renounced the doctrine as he matured, became more empirical, and gained distance from his Athenian mentor Plato. However, none of these thinkers provided the reasons for the Stagirite for how the universe necessarily lasts forever. Scott does.
All classicists know that Aristotle accepted the infinite past. Revising and extending the ground-breaking scholarship of Jaakko Hintikka and Sarah Broadie, this book demonstrates that Aristotle also held indubitably the Principle of Plenitude—“for infinite things, what may be, will be”—and that he even held it in modified form for finite things: “In infinite time, any (sort of genuine) possibility is actualized.” Since every (sort of) real possibility has already been fulfilled in infinite (past) time and since the universe still exists, Aristotle concludes in Metaphysics Theta 8 that there is no fear that the heavens will ever stop moving. For additional reasons based on a profound understanding of necessity and possibility that no scholar until now has seen in this precise context, and with no recourse to the Unmoved Mover, he asserts that this eternal motion is necessary.
Because the universe is not contingent, Aristotle can, and does, drop the doctrine of Pure Actuality, all of which solves another perennial problem in ancient Greek philosophy: The Peripatetics in Aristotle’s Lyceum and the other, later schools of philosophy like the Stoics never argued against the Unmoved Mover, even though they contested any important doctrine they found implausible. Scott’s interpretation finally explains this. These Greek thinkers knew that the mature Aristotle accepted the inherent necessity of the eternal universe, and they all embraced that doctrine, too, in spite of variations in details.

Aristotle's "Not to Fear" Proof for the Necessary Eternality of the Universe

Notice Regarding the Discontinued 1st Edition and the new 2nd Edition:  The 2nd edition in two volumes is recommended. Volume 1 is available at: https://www.amazon.com/dp/0999704923  Volume 2 will be available approximately 8/20/18 at: https://www.amazon.com/dp/099970494X  Although no significant change in philosophical content occurs, extensive editorial and formatting changes will result in the two volumes with 1.5 spacing instead of the one enormous volume with single spacing.  Because of various software, printing and editing errors, those who purchased the first edition may receive (with proof of purchase) a complimentary paperback copy of Edition 2 (including tax & shipping). A hardcover edition will also be available approximately September 2018, through bookstores or online sites. One may upgrade to the hardcover second edition from the first edition, for the incremental difference in cost. For either replacements or upgrades, please write to info@EPSpress.com.  Scott revolutionizes the standard interpretation of Aristotle’s Poetics, which has been considered to be literary theory since Avicenna wrote the first commentary in the 11th century, despite not one poem existing in the treatise! The treatise’s title and theme, stemming from poiesis  (“poetry”), have been interpreted as if they came from the sophist Gorgias (c.483-c.380 BCE), who first coined the meaning in 415 BCE. Scott demonstrates that by hypothesizing instead that poiesis  means what Plato (c.428-347 BCE ) says it means via Diotima in the Symposium, “‘music’ and verse,” we achieve a much clearer understanding of the Poetics and resolve a number of perennial dilemmas. For one, we understand why Aristotle (c. 384-322 BCE) does not care about the poetic forms per se in his treatise. He only focusses on tragedy and comedy, which were fully performed dramatic arts involving music, dance, and spectacle in his day (with the final art covered in the treatise, epic, being considered quasi-dramatic).  Scott’s revised article "The Poetics of Performance" (Cambridge University Press, 1999) is included, and additional arguments are given to show that because “music” is in the definition of tragedy "music" cannot be merely optional, as traditionally thought. Moreover, additional evidence is provided to reveal that HARMONIA KAI RHUTHMOS, always translated to this day as “harmony/melody and rhythm” in the context of orchestral art for Plato and Aristotle, must really mean “music and dance” in that context.  Also, in 2003 Scott published reasons in “Purging the Poetics” (Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy) why Aristotle could not have written the catharsis clause in the definition of tragedy. The article, reprinted as Chapter 5, has generated significant debate, with many specialists now supporting Scott with regards to catharsis itself. Here he provides the additional reasons why “pity and fear” are also inauthentic in the catharsis clause, even if they are authentic in the middle chapters. As a result, he demonstrates that tragedy for Aristotle is simply serious drama showing noteworthy individuals, which can end in misfortune or fortune, as proven by the best "tragedies" in Chapter 14 that end happily. The final chapters explain the real goal(s) of tragedy for Aristotle, and how he responds without catharsis to Plato’s censorship of tragedy and comedy in the ideal republic. All of this allows a fresh appraisal of the treatise that in spite of the two fundamental misconceptions has been the most important work of literary, dramatic and artistic theory in Western culture.

Aristotle on Dramatic Musical Composition: The Real Role of Literature, Catharsis, Music and Dance in the Poetics

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Aristotle DRAMATICS: also known as POETICS

Dance Theory of Plato and Aristotle: 3 Essays

History & Criticism

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Books by Scott, Gregory L.

See the best price to sell, buy, or rent books by Scott, Gregory L.. BookScouter helps to compare book prices from 25+ online bookstores and 30+ buyback vendors with a single search.

Aristotle's Favorite Tragedy: Oedipus or Cresphontes?

Aristotle's Favorite Tragedy: Oedipus or Cresphontes?

Aristotle on Dramatic Musical Composition: The Real Role of Literature, Catharsis, Music and Dance in the POETICS

Aristotle on Dramatic Musical Composition: The Real Role of Literature, Catharsis, Music and Dance in the POETICS

Aristotle’s “Not to Fear” Proof for the Necessary Eternality of the Universe

Aristotle's "Not to Fear" Proof for the Necessary Eternality of the Universe

Aristotle on Dramatic Musical Composition: The Real Role of Literature, Catharsis, Music and Dance in the Poetics

Aristotle DRAMATICS: also known as POETICS

Aristotle DRAMATICS: also known as POETICS

Dance Theory of Plato and Aristotle: 3 Essays