In Hollow Victory, iconoclastic defense analyst Jeffrey Record targets the conventional view of the Gulf War victory. In his characteristically provocative style, he answers controversial political, military, and strategic questions raised by the war and its aftermath, among them: Were the UN economic sanctions ever really given a chance to work? Could the war have been avoided altogether? Why were assessments of Iraqi strengths and weaknesses so inaccurate? How did the war's operational setting contribute to its outcome? Could a better general than Saddam Hussein have derailed Operation Desert Storm? What were the relative contributions of air, ground, and naval power? Did air power win the war? Were U.S. military planning and operations really free of meddling by civilian authorities? Did the U.S. armed services work together harmoniously? If you thought you understood what happened in Desert Storm, Hollow Victory will challenge your conclusions.

Hollow Victory: A Contrary View of the Gulf War

History

Record, Jeffrey

World

Potomac Books Inc.

Revising U.S. Military Strategy: Tailoring Means to Ends

Politics & Social Sciences

Politics & Government

Iraq And Vietnam: Differences, Similarities, And Insights

Terrill, W. Andrew

Military

Diane Pub Co.

Japan’s Decision for War in 1941: Some Enduring Lessons [Enlarged Edition]

Education & Teaching

Institute, Strategic Studies

Schools & Teaching

lulu.com

U.S. political and military diffi culties in Iraq have prompted comparisons to the American war in Vietnam. How, in fact, do the two wars compare? What are the differences and similarities, and what insights can be gained from examining them? Does the Vietnam War have instructive lessons for those dealing with today's challenges in Iraq, or is that war simply irrelevant? In the pages that follow, two highly qualifi ed analysts address these questions. Dr. Jeffrey Record, formerly a civilian pacifi cation advisor in Vietnam and author of books on both the Vietnam and Iraq wars, and W. Andrew Terrill, author and co-author of several Ssi studies on Iraq, conclude that the military dimensions of the two confl icts bear little comparison. Among other things, the sheer scale of the Vietnam War in terms of forces committed and losses incurred dwarfs that of the Iraq War.

Ends, Means, Ideology, And Pride: Why The Axis Lost And What We Can Learn From Its Defeat

Reference

Japan's Decision for War in 1941: Some Enduring Lessons

Asia

CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform

In examining the influence of historical analogies on decisions to use--or not use--force, military strategist Jeffrey Record assesses every major application of U.S. force from the Korean War to the NATO war on Serbia. Specifically, he looks at the influence of two analogies: the democracies? appeasement of Hitler at Munich and America's defeat in the Vietnam War. His book judges the utility of these two analogies on presidential decision-making and finds considerable misuse of them in situations where force was optional. He points to the Johnson administration's application of the Munich analogy to the circumstances of Southeast Asia in 1965 as the most egregious example of their misuse, but also cites the faulty reasoning by historical analogy that prevailed among critics of Reagan's policy in Central America and in Clinton's use of force in Haiti and the former Yugoslavia. 
The author's findings show generational experience to be a key influence on presidential decision-making: Munich persuaded mid-twentieth-century presidents that force should be used early and decisively while Vietnam cautioned later presidents against using force at all. Both analogies were at work for the Gulf War, with Munich urging a decision for war and Vietnam warning against a graduated and highly restricted use of force. Record also reminds us of the times when presidents have used analogies to mobilize public support for action they have already decided to take. Addressing both the process of presidential decision-making and the wisdom of decisions made, this well-reasoned book offers timely lessons to a broad audience that includes political scientists, military historians, defense analysts, and policy makers, as well as those simply curious about history's influence.

Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo

Naval Inst Pr

U.S. political and military difficulties in Iraq have prompted comparisons to the American war in Vietnam. The authors conclude that the military dimensions of the two conflicts bear little comparison. Among other things,the sheer scale of the Vietnam War in terms of forces committed and losses incurred dwarfs that of the Iraq War. They also conclude; however, that failed U.S. state-building in Vietnam and the impact of declining domestic political support for U.S. war aims in Vietnam are issues pertinent to current U.S. policy in Iraq.

Iraq and Vietnam: Differences, Similarities and Insights

Army War College, U.S.

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College

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Books by Record, Jeffrey