The materials for this study were originally prepared to meet an urgent request from the Directorate of Operational Requirements, Headquarters US.AF. Because of the continuingand growing interest in airborne operations, these materials have been refined and issued in the present form as a historical study. It is intended as a useful source of information for planners and others concerned with the relationship of past operations to the present and the future.With the exception of the southern France operation in August 1944, the most important USAF airborne operations of World War II and the Korean War have been included. They represent, however, almost all of the USAF airborne effort in these wars, for such other airborne operations as occurred were of lesser size and consequence. Statistical information has been limited to the most significant aspects of the operations. The footnotes are a reliable guide to sources that will provide far more detailed information on these operations than could be included here. Deserving of special commendation to the reader who is interested in further exploration of the subject are the two USAF Historical Division studies by John C. Warren: No. 74, Airborne Missions in the Mediterranean, 1942-1945, and No. 97, Airborne Operations in World War II, European Theater.

USAF Airborne Operations: World War II and Korean War

History

Office of Air Force History and U.S. Air Force

Military

CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform

This study continues through 1963 the account of Air Force special air warfare activities begun in AFCHO study USAF Counterinsurgency Doctrines and Capabilities--1961-1962. (The broader term--special air/warfare--replaced the term counterinsurgency in the Air Force late in 1963.) In the current study the author recounts the continuing Air Force-Army struggle over special warfare roles and missions; the OSD acceptance of an Air Force proposal to increase its special air warfare force; the Army's efforts to add organic aviation to its Special Forces; the relationship of STRICOM to the special warfare forces of the services; the buildup of special air warfare units in the unified commands; the growing importance of civic action and mobile training teams in underdeveloped nations; and progress in securing more modern aircraft. Although this study forms a part of a larger History of Headquarters USAF, it is being published separately to make it more readily available.

USAF Special Air Warfare: Doctrines and Capabilities, 1963

This study is the thirteenth in a series of historicalreports on the war in Southeast Asia prepared by the Office of Air Force History since 1965. The previous Works include: USAF Plans and Operations: The Air Campaign Against North Vietnam, 1966; The Air Force in Vietnam: The Search for Military Alternatives; and The Air Force in Southeast Asia: Toward a Bombing Halt, 1968.In this report the author has focused on policy changes introduced by the Nixon administration during 1969 in regards to the Vietnamese war, particularly as they affected the role of air power. Repeatedly expressing determination to end the war as early as possible on the basis of self-determination of the South Vietnamese people, President Nixon decided -- after negotiations with the Communists in Paris proved fruitless -- to unilaterally withdraw U.S. forces while simultaneously strengthening Saigon's forces to take up the slack.The first reduction in U.S. military strength inVietnam took place during the summer of 1969 when 25,000 troops were withdrawn. However, a particular phenomenon of the year was that air power was not materially reduced. The main theme of this history is that, in his effort to "winddown" the war via Vietnamization while maintaining pressure on North Vietnam to negotiate, the President made new and greater use of the U.S. air arm.

THE AIR FORCE IN VIETNAM: The Administration Emphasizes Air Power, 1969

As in World War II and the Korea police action, the enemy in Southeast Asia sought the protective concealment of darkness to move his troops and supplies. Although U.S. tactical aircrews cut roads and destroyed moving vehicles during daylight hours, they were ineffective at night. Jungle vegetation and mountainous terrain amplified their difficulties in finding and attacking the trucks, watercraft, and troops that poured southward each night through the maze of roads, footpaths, and streams that constituted the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail in eastern Laos. Casting about for an aircraft capable of interdicting the infiltration flow at night, the Air Force finally settled on a modified B-57 as the most suitable vehicle on which to mount and test new sensors and weapons in a night attack role. Conceived in 1967 as Project: Tropic Moon III, the B-57G was the first jet bomber specifically configured for self-contained night attack sorties in Southeast Asia. Within a relatively short time, the Air Force modified, tested; and flew the B-57G against hostile targets. When the Air Force decided that the time had come to withdraw the B-57Gs from Southeast Asia, Secretary of the Air Force Robert C. Seamans, Jr., wrote to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force that "it seems to me appropriate that we record and evaluate our experiences with the B-57Gs from concept formulation through redeployment to highlight those lessons which would be valuable in developing and employing similar systems in the future." That task was assigned to the Director of Operations in the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations at HQ USAF. Maj. Gen. Clifford D. Hargrove, the Deputy Director of Operations, asked the Chief of Air Force History for "assistance in preparing a historical study of the B-57G program." Mr. Richard A. Pfau a temporary staff member of the office of the Chief of Air Force History, undertook the task of preparing the desired monograph. Although he found most of his material in the files of the Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center at Maxwell Air Force Base, he exploited other repositories wherever possible, Before he returned to his university studies, Mr. Pfau prepared a first draft of the desired study. That manuscript and his notes remained inactive until early 1977, when they were sent to the Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center for historical review. Mr. William H. Greenhalgh, Jr., a staff historian at the center, conducted additional research, edited Mr. Pfau's work, and added material where necessary. The result is this study of the B-57G program from inception to termination.

The B-57G Tropic Moon III, 1967-1972

Air Power Helps Stop the Invasion and End the War 1972 (The Air Force in Southeast Asia)

Electronic Countermeasures in the Air War Against North Vietnam is one of a series of monographs on USAF tactics and techniques in Southeast Asia. Electronic countermeasures is but one aspect of the broad subject of electronic warfare, which was waged in all its complexity throughout Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, in choosing to deal with this topic, the Office of Air Force History faced a difficult security problem, for key material is so closely held that its inclusion might result in a history to which the average Air Force officer would not have access. As a result, this special intelligence was not used. Instead, various agencies involved in electronic countermeasures, having access to material not available to the historian, were invited to comment on a draft of the monograph, to ensure an essentially correct account.The author did most of his research at the Office of Air Force History, using materials obtained from the Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center and the Air University Library, Maxwell AFB, Ala. The U.S. Air Force Security Service, (USAFSS), San Antonio, Tex., furnished certain countermeasures evaluations that did not contain unusually sensitive information. Data from this organization supplemented the material assembled by the Strategic Air Command, Offutt AFB, Neb., on the 1972 B-52 campaign against North Vietnam.

Tactics and Techniques of Electronic Warfare: Electronic Countermeasures in the Air War Against North Vietnam, 1965-1973 (The Air Force in Southeast Asia)

This historical study deals with U.S. Air Force closeair support operations within the Republic of Vietnam, with the emphasis on tactics and techniques. The author. Lt. Col. Ralph Rowley, previously wrote two monographs dealing with the important role played by Forward Air Controllers (FAC's) in South Vietnam. In this study, he examines such operations from the viewpoint of the pilots and crews of the attack aircraft. These included T-28's, A-1E's, A-26's, A-7's, F-100's, B-26's and B-57's. The role of Air Force gunships--the AC-47, AC-119, and the AC-130--and the armed FAC also are discussed by the author. In addition, he describes the key role played by the Tactical Air Control System, which the Air Force established in Vietnam in the early 1960's. Colonel Rowley's monograph is the twentieth classified historical study on the war published by the Office of Air Force History since 1962.

Tactics and Techniques of Close Air Support Operations 1961 - 1973 (The Air Force in Southeast Asia)

In Part I of this two-part study the author traced the development of the role of the forward air controller through the early years of the war in Southeast Asia (1961-1964). The function of the air controller, however, was not unique to this conflict. Air strikes had been directed by American controllers, operating from the ground as early as 1927, when U.S. Marines supported the government of Nicaragua during its civil war. FAC's were again used by both the Axis and Allied powers during World War II, proving extremely effective in directing air strikes for both sides. During the Korean War a new wrinkle was added when the forward air controller moved into the old T-6 pilot trainer aircraft and became airborne. These controllers, known as "Mosquito" FAC's. found it much easier to see the target area from the strike pilot's perspective. thereby improving their control capability. Moreover, the FAC was able to observe enemy activity much better than a ground observer, who was limited by the nature of the terrain.Following the Korean armistice, the role of the forward air controller fell into disuse, especially during the mid- and late 1950' s, when the strategy of "massive nuclear retaliation" was adopted. Thus, when in late 1961 U.S. Army units were sent into South Vietnam, a general re-learning process took place. At first controllers began directing air strikes from the ground. But asenemy activity picked up, it became evident that the FAC could be much more responsive when airborne. Therefore, when the United States Army entered South Vietnam in large numbers in 1965-1966, its units were supported primarily by controllers flying in 0-1 liaison aircraft.The basic elements of forward air control were developed in the pre-1965 era in South Vietnam. Therefore, the problems that faced FAC's subsequently revolved around the enlargement of the FAC force to meet increased demands for their service. The theme, therefore, of this study concerns itself with early improvisation by the FAC force to meet the needs of Allied war effort. Training programs, both in the United States and in South Vietnam, underwent constant enlargement and evaluation in order to maintaina competent product for forward air control in SEA. The 0-1, considered inadequate from the beginning, underwent modification and refurbishing in order to provide an air control vehicle until the 0-2A and OV-10 arrived on the scene to supplement and eventually replace it. Coordination became smoother as the services worked more closely together to provide the best air support possible. Tactics changed as the enemy threat became more dangerous. And the role of the forward air controller vastly expanded. By the end of the conflict, the FAC's not only controlled air strikes, but flew air cover for convoys and other troop movements, dropped propaganda leaflets, performed aerial reconnaissance sorties, and supported a variety of military operations, including assisting Special Forces clandestine missions. Moreover, before the United States pulled out of Southeast Asia in 1973, the FAC role saw the introduction of jet forward air controllers to operate in high threat areas, the inclusion of C-130's, and C-123's as FACaircraft for night operations and the development of the armed FAC concept.The detailing of events included in this study could not have been accomplished without the help of dozens of Air Force officers, who willingly agreed to interviews to fill in gaps where historical records did not cover. In addition, the numerous histories, letters, messages and studies cited all contributed significantly to round out the story. Their contributions are noted in the source citations. Finally, the editorial staff of the Office of Air Force History contributed greatly to this work with their technical assistance.

FAC Operations 1965-1970 (The Air Force in Southeast Asia)

The Air Force in Southeast Asia: Logistic Plans and Policies, 1968-1969

The Army Air Forces Statistical Digest: World War II published by the Office of the Statistical Control, Headquarters, Army Air Forces, makes available in one volume and on a uniform basis summary statistics on AAF personnel, aircraft, equipment, combat operations and other activities during World War II.

Army Air Forces Statistical Digest: World War II

See the best price to sell, buy, or rent books by Office of Air Force History and U.S. Air Force. BookScouter helps to compare book prices from 25+ online bookstores and 30+ buyback vendors with a single search.

Books by Office of Air Force History and U.S. Air Force