Glow-worms

John, Tyler

Tyler-Scagell

In recent years, some public officials and advocacy groups have urged that private philanthropies be subject to more uniform standards and stricter government regulationranging from board composition to grant distribution to philanthropies' charitable purposes. A major justification cited by advocates of these proposals is the claim that the charitable tax exemption and deduction are government subsidies, and thus philanthropic funds are ""public money"" and should be publicly controlled. Some advocates also claim that philanthropic assets are public money because philanthropies operate under state charters and are subject to state oversight.   In the second edition of this monograph, legal scholars Evelyn Brody and John Tyler evaluate the legal basis of the ""public money"" claim. They conclude that it is not well founded in legal authority. State oversight of philanthropies is not based on an assertion that philanthropies are subject to state direction or that their assets belong to the public, they write. Similarly, the fact that philanthropies have state charters does not make them state agencies or subject them to the constraints that apply to public bodies. Finally, the philanthropies and their donors receive their federal tax benefits in return for the obligation to pursue public rather than private purposes and to comply with the laws designed to ensure the pursuit of such purposes. There is no evidence, Brody and Tyler find, that these benefits were meant to give government other types of control over philanthropies.  Today, however, a new set of challenges confronts American philanthropy. With disturbing frequency, activists, legislators, and policymakers are claiming governmental authority to regulate the activities of American philanthropists. Such proposals are frequently justified with the claim that philanthropic assets are public money. Proponents of this view argue that the charitable tax exemption and deduction are government subsidies; thus, philanthropic funds are public money and should be publicly controlled. Some advocates additionally claim that philanthropic assets are public money because philanthropies operate under state charters and are subject to state oversight.  The public money claim is not well founded in legal authority. State oversight of philanthropies is based on the need to ensure that philanthropies pursue charitable rather than private purposes, not on an assertion that philanthropies are subject to state direction or that their assets belong to the public. Similarly, the fact that philanthropies have state charters does not make them state agencies or generally subject them to the constraints that apply to public bodies. Finally, the fact that philanthropies and their donors receive their federal tax benefits in return for the obligation to pursue public rather than private purposes and to comply with the laws designed to ensure the pursuit of such purposes; there is no evidence that these benefits were meant to give government other types of control over philanthropies.  Advocates of greater government control of philanthropies may therefore not justify their proposals with the claim that philanthropic assets are public money. They may make other arguments for their position, but these arguments must be evaluated in light of the strong authority in favor of charitable independence, the contributions of foundations and other charities to American society under the traditional, limited philanthropy-government relationship, and the serious consequences that greater government control could have for this relationship.

How Public Is Private Philanthropy? Separating Reality from Myth

Politics & Social Sciences

Evelyn Brody

Social Sciences

The Philanthropy Roundtable

<p>As outspoken in his day as Richard Dawkins or Christopher Hitchens are today, American freethinker and author ROBERT GREEN INGERSOLL (1833-1899) was a notorious radical whose uncompromising views on religion and slavery (they were bad, in his opinion), women's suffrage (a good idea, he believed), and other contentious matters of his era made him a wildly popular orator and critic of 19th-century American culture and public life. As a speaker dedicated to expanding intellectual horizons and celebrating the value of skepticism, Ingersoll spoke frequently on such topics as atheism, freedom from the pressures of conformity, and the lives of philosophers who espoused such concepts. This collection of his most famous speeches includes the lectures: [ "The Gods" (1872) [ "Humboldt" (1869) [ "Thomas Paine" (1870) [ "Individuality" (1873) [ "Heretics and Heresies" (1874)</p>

Letter of John Tyler, a Senator from the State of Virginia, to the speakers and members of the Gener

History

BiblioLife

Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers’ Brief

Since 2013, an organization called the Nonhuman Rights Project has brought before the New York State courts an unusual request―asking for habeas corpus hearings to determine whether Kiko and Tommy, two captive chimpanzees, should be considered legal persons with the fundamental right to bodily liberty.  While the courts have agreed that chimpanzees share emotional, behavioural, and cognitive similarities with humans, they have denied that chimpanzees are persons on superficial and sometimes conflicting grounds. Consequently, Kiko and Tommy remain confined as legal "things" with no rights. The major moral and legal question remains unanswered: are chimpanzees mere "things", as the law currently sees them, or can they be "persons" possessing fundamental rights?  In Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers’ Brief, a group of renowned philosophers considers these questions. Carefully and clearly, they examine the four lines of reasoning the courts have used to deny chimpanzee personhood: species, contract, community, and capacities. None of these, they argue, merits disqualifying chimpanzees from personhood. The authors conclude that when judges face the choice between seeing Kiko and Tommy as things and seeing them as persons―the only options under current law―they should conclude that Kiko and Tommy are persons who should therefore be protected from unlawful confinement "in keeping with the best philosophical standards of rational judgment and ethical standards of justice."  Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers’ Brief―an extended version of the amicus brief submitted to the New York Court of Appeals in Kiko’s and Tommy’s cases―goes to the heart of fundamental issues concerning animal rights, personhood, and the question of human and nonhuman nature. It is essential reading for anyone interested in these issues.

Johnson, L. Syd M

Sebo, Jeff

Kymlicka, Will

Comstock, Gary

Donaldson, Sue

Nobis, Nathan

Andrews, Kristin

Fenton, Andrew

Meynell, Letitia

Peña-Guzmán, David

G.K.D., Crozier

JONES, ROBERT

Philosophy

Routledge

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Books by John, Tyler