The Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, subsequent war in Eastern Ukraine and economic sanctions imposed by the West, transformed European politics. These events marked a dramatic shift away from the optimism of the post-Cold War era. The conflict did not escalate to the levels originally feared but nor was either side able to bring it to a definitive conclusion. Ukraine suffered a loss of territory but was not forced into changing its policies away from the Westward course adopted as a result of the EuroMaidan uprising of February 2014. President Putin was left supporting a separatist enclave as Russia's economy suffered significant damage. In Ukraine and the Art of Strategy, Lawrence Freedman-author of the landmark Strategy: A History-provides an account of the origins and course of the Russia-Ukraine conflict through the lens of strategy. Freedman describes the development of President Putin's anxieties that former Soviet countries were being drawn towards the European Union, the effective pressure he put on President Yanokvych of Ukraine during 2013 to turn away from the EU and the resulting 'EuroMaidan Revolution' which led to Yanukovych fleeing. He explores the reluctance of Putin to use Russian forces to do more that consolidate the insurgency in Eastern Ukraine, the failure of the Minsk peace process and the limits of the international response. Putin's strategic-making is kept in view at all times, including his use of 'information warfare' and attempts to influence the American election. In contrast to those who see the Russian leader as a master operator who catches out the West with bold moves Freedman sees him as impulsive and so forced to improvise when his gambles fail. Freedman's application of his strategic perspective to this supremely important conflict challenges our understanding of some of its key features and the idea that Vladimir Putin is unmatched as a strategic mastermind.

Ukraine and the Art of Strategy

History

Freedman, Lawrence

Europe

Oxford University Press

Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam

In his thousand-day presidency, John F. Kennedy led America through one of its most difficult and potentially explosive eras. With the Cold War at its height and the threat of communist advances in Europe and the Third World, Kennedy had the unenviable task of maintaining U.S. solidarity without leading the western world into a nuclear catastrophe. In Kennedy's Wars, noted historian Lawrence Freedman draws on the best of Cold War scholarship and newly released government documents to illuminate Kennedy's approach to war and his efforts for peace. He recreates insightfully the political and intellectual milieu of the foreign policy establishment during Kennedy's era with vivid profiles of his top advisors--Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, Robert Kennedy--and influential figures such as Dean Acheson and Walt Rostow. Tracing the evolution of traditional liberalism into the Cold War liberalism of Kennedy's cabinet, Freedman evaluates their responses to the tensions in Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam. He gives each conflict individual attention, showing how foreign policy decisions came to be defined for each new crisis in the light of those that had gone before. Readers will follow Kennedy as he wrestles with the succession of major conflicts--taking advice, weighing the risks of inadvertently escalating the Cold War into outright military confrontation, exploring diplomatic options, and forming strategic judgments that would eventually prevent a major war during his presidency. Kennedy's Wars offers a dynamic and human portrait of Kennedy under pressure: a political leader shaped by the ideas of his time, conscious of his vulnerability to electoral defeat but also of his nation's vulnerability to nuclear war. Military and Kennedy enthusiasts will find its balanced consideration of the president's foreign policy and provocative "what if" scenarios invaluable keys to understanding his accomplishments, failures, and enduring legacy.

Americas

In his thousand-day presidency, John F. Kennedy led America through one of its most difficult and potentially explosive eras. With the Cold War at its height and the threat of communist advances in Europe and the Third World, Kennedy had the unenviable task of maintaining U.S. solidarity without leading the western world into a nuclear catastrophe. In Kennedy's Wars, noted historian Lawrence Freedman draws on the best of Cold War scholarship and newly released government documents to illuminate Kennedy's approach to war and his efforts for peace. He recreates insightfully the political and intellectual milieu of the foreign policy establishment during Kennedy's era with vivid profiles of his top advisors--Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, Robert Kennedy--and influential figures such as Dean Acheson and Walt Rostow. Tracing the evolution of traditional liberalism into the Cold War liberalism of Kennedy's cabinet, Freedman evaluates their responses to the tensions in Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam. He gives each conflict individual attention, showing how foreign policy decisions came to be defined for each new crisis in the light of those that had gone before. The book follows Kennedy as he wrestles with the succession of major conflicts--taking advice, weighing the risks of inadvertently escalating the Cold War into outright military confrontation, exploring diplomatic options, and forming strategic judgments that would eventually prevent a major war during his presidency.

Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine

Using examples from a wide variety of conflicts, Lawrence Freedman shows that successful military command depends on the ability not only to use armed forces effectively but also to understand the political context in which they are operating.\nCommand in war is about forging effective strategies and implementing them, making sure that orders are appropriate, well-communicated, and then obeyed. But it is also an intensely political process. This is largely because how wars are fought depends to a large extent on how their aims are set. It is also because commanders in one realm must possess the ability to work with other command structures, including those of other branches of the armed forces and allies. In Command, Lawrence Freedman explores the importance of political as well as operational considerations in command with a series of eleven vivid case studies, all taken from the period after 1945. Over this period, the risks of nuclear escalation led to a shift away from great power confrontations and towards civil wars, and advances in communication technologies made it easier for higher-level commanders to direct their subordinates.\nFreedman covers defeats as well as victories. Pakistani generals tried to avoid surrender as they were losing the eastern part of their country to India in 1971. Iraq's Saddam Hussein turned his defeats into triumphant narratives of victory. Osama bin Laden escaped the Americans in Afghanistan in 2001. The UK struggled as a junior partner to the US in Iraq after 2003. We come across insubordinate generals, such as Israel's Arik Sharon, and those in the French army in Algeria, so frustrated with their political leadership that they twice tried to change it. At the other end of the scale, Che Guevara in Congo in 1966 and Igor Girkin in Ukraine in 2014 both tried to spark local wars to suit their grandiose objectives.\nFreedman ends the book with a meditation on the future of command in a world that is becoming increasingly reliant on technologies like artificial intelligence. A wide-ranging and insightful history of the changing nature of command in the postwar era, this will stand as a definitive account of a foundational concept in both military affairs and politics.

Military

Using examples from a wide variety of conflicts, Lawrence Freedman shows that successful military command depends on the ability not only to use armed forces effectively but also to understand the political circumstances in which they are operating.\nCommand in war is about forging effective strategies and implementing them, making sure that orders are appropriate, well communicated, and then obeyed. But it is also an intensely political process. This is because of the importance of war aims and how they are set, as well as the need to work with other command structures, including those of other branches of the armed forces and allies. In this innovative study, Lawrence Freedman explores the importance of political as well as operational considerations in command with a series of vivid case studies, all taken from the period after 1945. Over this period the risks of nuclear escalation led to a shift away from great power confrontations, and towards civil wars.\nThe chapters cover defeats as well as victories. Pakistani generals try to avoid surrender as they lose the eastern part of their country to India in 1971. Iraq's Saddam Hussein turns his defeats into triumphant narratives of victory. Osama bin Laden escapes the Americans in Afghanistan in 2001. The UK struggles as a junior partner to the US in Iraq after 2003. We come across insubordinate generals, such as Israel's Arik Sharon, and those in the French army in Algeria, so frustrated with their political leadership that they twice tried to change it. At the other end of the scale Che Guevara in Congo in 1966 and Igor Girkin in Ukraine in 2014 both try to spark local wars to suit their grandiose objectives.

Rapid developments in information technology and precision weaponry are said to herald a 'revolution in military affairs' (RMA), making possible quick and decisive victories with minimal casualties and collateral damage. But has such a revolution taken place? The issues that drive conflict will persist, and many of the technical advances associated with the RMA will not necessarily produce a transformation in the nature of warfare. The end of the Cold War has highlighted another revolution one in political affairs. Major powers appear less likely to go to war with one another than they are to intervene in conflicts involving weak states, with potential opponents including militia groups, drug cartels and terrorists. RMA technology may be less suited to conflicts such as these. If the cumulative effect of these changes has produced a revolution, it is a revolution in strategic, as much as military, affairs. This paper argues that: <ul>
<li>the RMA is the practical expression of a 'Western Way of Warfare', the key features of which are: professional armed forces; intolerance of casualties; and intolerance of collateral damage</li> <li>the key technological and conceptual components of the RMA were in place by the early 1970s. The trend has therefore been evolutionary, rather than revolutionary. The significant difference is in the new political setting of the end of the Cold War, and the revolution in perceptions of Western particularly US conventional military strength brought about by the Gulf War of 1991</li> <li>the Gulf conflict could mark the start of a true 'revolution' if future battles offer similar opportunities to exploit the RMA's technology. However, since the US and its allies appear unbeatable when fighting on their own terms, future opponents will fight differently</li> <li>the West will therefore face opponents who will follow strategies that contradict the Western Way of Warfare. They will avoid pitched battles, will exploit the West's reluctance to inflict civilian suffering, and will target their opponent's domestic political base, as much as its forward troops. </li>
</ul>
The problem for the West is not how to prevail, but how to do so in an acceptable manner. The more warfare becomes entwined with civilian activity, the more difficult it is to respond with the type of decisive and overwhelming military means embodied in the RMA. The RMA does not create a situation in which information is the only commodity at stake, and so does not offer the prospect of a 'virtual war'. The new circumstances and capabilities do not prescribe one strategy, but extend the range of strategies available. The issue underlying the RMA is the ability of Western countries, in particular the US, to follow a line geared to their own interests and capabilities.

The Revolution in Strategic Affairs (Adelphi series)

Reference

Routledge

A renowned historian and security analyst sheds new light on America's quintessential foreign policy dilemma: our recent engagement in the Middle East.  It is in the Middle East that the U.S. has been made to confront its attitudes on the use of force, the role of allies, and international law. The history of the U.S. in the Middle East, then, becomes an especially revealing mirror on America's view of its role in the wider world.  In this wise, objective, and illuminating history, Lawrence Freedman shows how three key events in 1978-79 helped establish the foundations for U.S. involvement in the Middle East that would last for thirty years, without offering any straightforward or bloodless exit options: the Camp David summit leading to the Israel-Egypt Treaty; the Iranian Islamic revolution leading to the Shah's departure followed by the hostage crisis; and the socialist revolution in Afghanistan, resulting in the doomed Soviet intervention.  Freedman makes clear how America's strategic choices in those and subsequent crises led us to where we are today. A Choice of Enemies is essential reading for anyone concerned with the complex politics of the region or with the future of American foreign policy.

A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East

Weidenfeld&Nicolson

World War Two left two compelling, indelible images that colored the decades to come: the immense force of the Soviet Union's Red Army and the horrific devastation wrought by the atomic bombing of Hiroshima/Nagasaki. For the next half-century, the great powers prepared themselves for another, deadlier international conflagration...one that never happened. Politicians and strategists devoted time, intellectual energy, and financial resources figuring out how to fight--or avoid--nuclear war; meanwhile the industrial complex dedicated itself to producing ever more complex weaponry. Through thoughtful analysis and striking photography, follow the changing expectations during this period, and how these expectations were influenced by the actual experience of limited warfare. From the evolution of nuclear strategy and technology to the effect of Korea and Vietnam to contemporary conflicts like Desert Storm, you'll see how a revival of conventional strategy has raised the possibility of a revolution in military affairs.

The History of Warfare: Cold War

Cassell

Five years after the publication of the first edition, this second edition brings the discussion up-to-date by assessing the new agreement between the US and the Soviet Union. The essays point out that the underlying rivalry stills remains and could destroy the progress made if it is not addressed. The decline of the peace movements, new threats to stability, and prospects for further detente. Annotation copyright Book News, Inc. Portland, Or.

Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace

Baylis, John

Segal, Gerald

Moreton, Edwina

PALGRAVE~MACMILLAN

First published twenty years ago, Lawrence Freedman's Evolution of Nuclear Strategy was immediately acclaimed as the standard work on the history of attempts to cope militarily and politically with the terrible destructive power of nuclear weapons. It has now been rewritten, drawing on a wide range of new research, and updated to take account of the period following the end of the cold war, taking the story to contemporary arguments about missile defence.

The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy

St.Martin's Press

See the best price to sell, buy, or rent books by Freedman, Lawrence. BookScouter helps to compare book prices from 25+ online bookstores and 30+ buyback vendors with a single search.

Books by Freedman, Lawrence

See the best price to sell, buy, or rent books by Freedman, Lawrence. BookScouter helps to compare book prices from 25+ online bookstores and 30+ buyback vendors with a single search.

Ukraine and the Art of Strategy

Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam

Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam

Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine

Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine

The Revolution in Strategic Affairs (Adelphi series)

A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East

The History of Warfare: Cold War

Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace

The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy