The battle at Kursk in 1943 is often referred to as the greatest tank battle in the history of warfare. This volume makes extensive use of German archival documents as well as various Russian books and articles. As well as an account of the battle, it addresses methodological issues.

Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis (Soviet (Russian) Study of War)

History

Frankson, Anders

Zetterling, Niklas

Military

Routledge

Kursk 1943 (Soviet (Russian) Study of War)

At the end of September 1941, more than a million German soldiers lined up along the frontline just 180 miles west of Moscow. They were well trained, confident, and had good reasons to hope that the war in the East would be over with one last offensive. Facing them was an equally large Soviet force, but whose soldiers were neither as well trained nor as confident. When the Germans struck, disaster soon befell the Soviet defenders. German panzer spearheads cut through enemy defenses and thrust deeply to encircle most of the Soviet soldiers on the approaches to Moscow. Within a few weeks, most of them marched into captivity, where a grim fate awaited them. Despite the overwhelming initial German success, however, the Soviet capital did not fall. German combat units as well as supply transport were bogged down in mud caused by autumn rains. General Zhukov was called back to Moscow and given the desperate task to recreate defense lines west of Moscow. The mud allowed him time to accomplish this, and when the Germans again began to attack in November, they met stiffer resistance. Even so, they came perilously close to the capital, and if the vicissitudes of weather had cooperated, would have seized it. Though German units were also fighting desperately by now, the Soviet build-up soon exceeded their own. THE DRIVE ON MOSCOW: Operation Taifun, 1941 is based on numerous archival records, personal diaries, letters, and other sources. It recreates the battle from the perspective of the soldiers as well as the generals. The battle, not fought in isolation, had a crucial role in the overall German strategy in the East, and its outcome reveals why the failure of the German assault on Moscow may well have been the true turning point of World War II. Niklas Zetterling is a researcher at the Swedish Defense College. Along with Anders Frankson he has previously written Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis and The Korsun Pocket: The Encirclement and Breakout of a German Army in the East, 1944. Both authors currently live in Sweden Table of Contents PREFACE PROLOGUE 1. THE SOVIET DEFENSE OF MOSCOW 2. OPERATION TAIFUN—THE GERMAN PLANS 3. GUDERIAN ATTACKS 4. THE MAIN GERMAN ATTACK BEGINS 5. THE OFFENSIVE CONTINUES 6. ENCIRCLEMENT 7. CUT OFF 8. STRATEGIC DECISIONS 9. VYAZMA-BRYANSK 10. ONE HUNDRED KILOMETERS TO MOSCOW 11. ON TO TULA 12. THE END OF OCTOBER—HALFTIME FOR OPERATION TAIFUN 13. THE NOVEMBER 7 PARADE 14. THE ORSHA MEETING, NOVEMBER 13 15. THE FINAL ATTEMPT 16. AT THE GATES OF MOSCOW 17. CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES APPENDICES NOTES BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX

The Drive on Moscow, 1941: Operation Taifun and Germany's First Great Crisis of World War II

Europe

Casemate Publishers

The Drive on Moscow, 1941: Operation Taifun and Germany’s First Great Crisis of World War II

At the end of September 1941, more than a million German soldiers lined up along the frontline just 180 miles west of Moscow. They were well trained, confident, and had good reasons to hope that the war in the East would be over with one last offensive. Facing them was an equally large Soviet force, but whose soldiers were neither as well trained nor as confident. When the Germans struck, disaster soon befell the Soviet defenders. German panzer spearheads cut through enemy defenses and thrust deeply to encircle most of the Soviet soldiers on the approaches to Moscow. Within a few weeks, most of them marched into captivity, where a grim fate awaited them. Despite the overwhelming initial German success, however, the Soviet capital did not fall. German combat units as well as supply transport were bogged down in mud caused by autumn rains. General Zhukov was called back to Moscow and given the desperate task to recreate defense lines west of Moscow. The mud allowed him time to accomplish this, and when the Germans again began to attack in November, they met stiffer resistance. Even so, they came perilously close to the capital, and if the vicissitudes of weather had cooperated, would have seized it. Though German units were also fighting desperately by now, the Soviet build-up soon exceeded their own. THE DRIVE ON MOSCOW: Operation Taifun, 1941 is based on numerous archival records, personal diaries, letters, and other sources. It recreates the battle from the perspective of the soldiers as well as the generals. The battle, not fought in isolation, had a crucial role in the overall German strategy in the East, and its outcome reveals why the failure of the German assault on Moscow may well have been the true turning point of World War II. Niklas Zetterling is a researcher at the Swedish Defense College. Along with Anders Frankson he has previously written Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis and The Korsun Pocket: The Encirclement and Breakout of a German Army in the East, 1944. Both authors currently live in Sweden Table of Contents PREFACE PROLOGUE 1. THE SOVIET DEFENSE OF MOSCOW 2. OPERATION TAIFUN—THE GERMAN PLANS 3. GUDERIAN ATTACKS 4. THE MAIN GERMAN ATTACK BEGINS 5. THE OFFENSIVE CONTINUES 6. ENCIRCLEMENT 7. CUT OFF 8. STRATEGIC DECISIONS 9. VYAZMA-BRYANSK 10. ONE HUNDRED KILOMETERS TO MOSCOW 11. ON TO TULA 12. THE END OF OCTOBER—HALFTIME FOR OPERATION TAIFUN 13. THE NOVEMBER 7 PARADE 14. THE ORSHA MEETING, NOVEMBER 13 15. THE FINAL ATTEMPT 16. AT THE GATES OF MOSCOW 17. CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES APPENDICES NOTES BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX

Casemate

During the second half of 1943, after the failure at Kursk, Germany’s Army Group South fell back from Russia under repeated hammer blows from the Red Army. Under Erich von Manstein, however, the Germans were able to avoid serious defeats, while at the same time fending off Hitler’s insane orders to hold on to useless territory. Then, in January 1944, a disaster happened. Six divisions of Army Group South became surrounded after sudden attacks by the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts under command of generals Nikolai Vatutin and Ivan Konev around the village of Korsun (near the larger town of Cherkassy on the Dnieper). The Germans’ greatest fear was the prospect of another Stalingrad, the catastrophe that had occurred precisely one year before. This time, though, Manstein was in control from the start, and he immediately rearranged his Army Group to rescue his trapped divisions. A major panzer drive got underway, led by General der Panzertruppen Hans Hube, a survivor from Stalingrad pocket, which promptly ran up against several soviet tank armies. Leading the break-in was Franz Baeke with his Tiger and Panther-tanks. Due to both weather and ferocious resistance, the German drive stalled. Ju-52s still flew into Korsun’s airfield, delivering supplies and taking out wounded, but it soon became apparent that only one option remained for the beleaguered defenders: breakout. Without consulting Hitler, on the night of February 16 Manstein ordered the breakout to begin. Led by the strongest formation within the pocket, SS Wiking, the trapped forces surged out and soon rejoined the surrounding panzer divisions who had been fully engaged in weakening the ring. When dawn broke, the Soviets realized their prey was escaping. Although the Germans within the pocket lost nearly all of their heavy weapons and left many wounded behind, their escape was effected. Stalin, having anticipated another Stalingrad, was left with little but an empty bag, as Army Group South—this time—had pulled off a rescue. In The Korsun Pocket, Niklas Zetterling, a researcher at the Swedish Defense College since 1995 and Anders Frankson, have provided a highly detailed and often breathtaking account of one of the most dramatic battles of World War II. From grand strategy to soldiers’ voices on the ground, including expert statistical analysis, the action, and the stakes, of the battle at Korsun are made vividly clear. Table of Contents Preface Prologue Chapter 1 Background: The War in the East Chapter 2 The Battles on the Dnepr Chapter 3 Planning, Preparation, and Readiness Chapter 4 The Condition of the Armies Chapter 5 Konev Attacks Chapter 6 The Soviet Breakthrough Chapter 7 Vatutin’s Attack Chapter 8 The Korsun Pocket Chapter 9 The Red Army Squeezes the Pocket Chapter 10 Von Vormann’s Counterattack Chapter 11 Hube Assembles a Rescue Force Chapter 12 Breith’s III Panzer Corps Attacks Chapter 13 8th Army, 4–10 February Chapter 14 Breith Tries Again Chapter 15 Stalin Invervenes Chapter 16 “Now or Never” Chapter 17 Time is Running Out Chapter 18 Breakout from the Korsun Pocket Chapter 19 Aftermath Notes on the Text Appendix I Orders of Battle Appendix II German Combat Units in the Battle Notes on the Appendices Index

Korsun Pocket: The Encirclement and Breakout of a German Army in the East, 1944

Americas

Casemate Pub

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