Distilling the ideas of the greatest military theoreticians of history, including Sun Tzu, Niccolò Machiavelli, and Carl von Clausewitz, this clear and engaging Very Short Introduction presents a fascinating account of the "art of the general." Antulio J. Echevarria II highlights the dynamic relationship between the main elements of strategy: purpose, method, and means. Drawing on historical examples, he discusses the major types of military strategy and how emerging technologies are affecting them. This second edition has been updated throughout, and now includes an extended chapter on cyberwarfare which shows how the use of social media platforms to influence opinions on political views and manipulate populations to act in certain ways has evolved from an art to a science.

Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction, Second Edition

History

Echevarria II, Antulio J.

Military

Oxford University Press

Clausewitz and Contemporary War

While many scholars agree that Clausewitz's On War is frequently misunderstood, almost none have explored his methodology to see whether it might enhance our understanding of his concepts. This book lays out Clausewitz's methodology in a brisk and straightforward style. It then uses that as a basis for understanding his contributions to the ever growing body of knowledge of war. The specific contributions this study addresses are Clausewitz's theories concerning the nature of war, the relationship between war and politics, and several of the major principles of strategy he examined. These theories and principles lie at the heart of the current debates over the nature of contemporary conflict. They also underpin much of the instruction that prepares military and civilian leaders for their roles in the development and execution of military strategy. Thus, they are important even in circles where Clausewitz is only briefly studied. While understanding On War is no more a prerequisite for winning wars than knowledge is a requirement for exercising power, Clausewitz's opus has become something of an authoritative reference for those desiring to expand their knowledge of war. By linking method and concept, this book contributes significantly to that end.

Distilling the ideas of the greatest military theoreticians of history, including Sun Tzu, Niccol� Machiavelli, and Carl von Clausewitz, Antulio J. Echevarria II presents a fascinating account of the "art of the general." Drawing on historical examples, from Hannibal's war against Rome to Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz, from the Allies' campaign to overwhelm Hitler's fortress to the terror attacks of September 11, Echevarria vividly describes the major types of military strategy and their advantages and disadvantages. Clear and engaging, this book shows that military strategy is essential for understanding major events of the past and becomes even more critical today, in a world increasingly threatened by weapons of mass destruction, terrorist attacks, and new dimensions of conflict such as cyberwar and space.

Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions)

While many scholars agree that Clausewitz's On War is frequently misunderstood, almost none have explored his methodology to see whether it might enhance our understanding of his concepts. This book lays out Clausewitz's methodology in a brisk and straightforward style. It then uses that as a basis for understanding his contributions to the ever growing body of knowledge of war. The specific contributions this study addresses are Clausewitz's theories concerning the nature of war, the relationship between war and politics, and several of the major principles of strategy he examined. These theories and principles lie at the heart of the current debates over the nature of contemporary conflict. They also underpin much of the instruction that prepares military and civilian leaders for their roles in the development and execution of military strategy. Thus, they are important even in circles where Clausewitz is only briefly studied. While understanding On War is no more a prerequisite for winning wars than knowledge is a requirement for exercising power, Clausewitz's opus has become something of an authoritative reference for those desiring to expand their knowledge of war. By linking method and concept, this book contributes significantly to that end.

The writings of Carl von Clausewitz loom so large in the annals of military theory that they obscure the substantial contributions of thinkers who came after him. This is especially true for those German theorists who wrote during the half century preceding World War I. However, as Antulio Echevarria argues, although none of those thinkers approached Clausewitz's stature, they were nonetheless theorists of considerable vision. The Kaiser's theorists have long been portrayed as narrow-minded thinkers rigidly attached to an outmoded way of war, little altered since Napoleon's time. According to this view, they ignored or simply failed to understand how industrialization and modernization had transformed the conduct of war. They seemed unaware of how numerous advances in technology and weaponry had so increased the power of the defensive that decisive victory had become virtually impossible. But Echevarria disputes this traditional view and convincingly shows that these theorists—Boguslawski, Goltz, Schlieffen, Hoenig, and their American and European counterparts-were not the architects of outmoded theories. In fact, they duly appreciated the implications of the vast advances in modern weaponry (as well as in transportation and communications) and set about finding solutions that would restore offensive maneuver to the battlefield. Among other things, they underscored the emerging need for synchronizing concentrated firepower with rapid troop movements, as well as the necessity of a decentralized command scheme in order to cope with the greater tempo, lethality, and scope of modern warfare. In effect, they redefined the essential relations among the combined arms of infantry, artillery, and cavalry Echevarria goes on to suggest that attempts to apply new military theories and doctrine were uneven due to deficiencies in training and an overall lack of interest in theory among younger officers. It is this failure of application, more than the theories themselves, that are responsible for the ruinous slaughter of World War I.

After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers Before the Great War

University Press of Kansas

Preparing for One War and Getting Another?

Strategic Studies Institute

Independently published

Antulio J. Echevarria II reveals how successive generations of American strategic theorists have thought about war. Analyzing the work of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Billy Mitchell, Bernard Brodie, Robert Osgood, Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn, Henry Eccles, Joseph Wiley, Harry Summers, John Boyd, William Lind, and John Warden, he uncovers the logic that underpinned each theorist's critical concepts, core principles, and basic assumptions about the nature and character of war. In so doing, he identifies four paradigms of war's nature - traditional, modern, political, and materialist - that have shaped American strategic thought. If war's logic is political, as Carl von Clausewitz said, then so too is thinking about war.

War's Logic: Strategic Thought and the American Way of War (Cambridge Military Histories)

Cambridge University Press

War's Logic (Cambridge Military Histories)

From “Defending Forward” To A “Global Defense-in-Depth”: Globalization And Homeland Security

Education & Teaching

Tussing, Bert B.

Schools & Teaching

lulu.com

Over the last 25 years, the center of gravity concept has grown increasingly central to the U.S. military's warfighting doctrine. It has been hailed by each of the Services and the Joint community as the cornerstone of the operational art; and it has come to occupy a common place in the vocabulary of professional soldiers. It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that, over the last quarter-century especially, the term has come to have so many different meanings. In this monograph, the author, Lieutenant Colonel Antulio Echevarria II, cuts through the myriad interpretations surrounding the concept and gets back to the original idea as conceived by its author, the Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz. In going back to the original concept, Lieutenant Colonel Echevarria reveals that Clausewitz intended the center of gravity to function much as its counterpart in the mechanical sciences does, that is, as a focal point.

Clausewitz’s Center Of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine - Again!

Institute, Strategic Studies

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Books by Echevarria II, Antulio J.

See the best price to sell, buy, or rent books by Echevarria II, Antulio J.. BookScouter helps to compare book prices from 25+ online bookstores and 30+ buyback vendors with a single search.

Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction, Second Edition

Clausewitz and Contemporary War

Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions)

Clausewitz and Contemporary War

After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers Before the Great War

Preparing for One War and Getting Another?

War's Logic: Strategic Thought and the American Way of War (Cambridge Military Histories)

War's Logic (Cambridge Military Histories)

From “Defending Forward” To A “Global Defense-in-Depth”: Globalization And Homeland Security

Clausewitz’s Center Of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine - Again!