The only book on the market to include classical and contemporary readings from key authors in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE), this unique anthology provides a comprehensive overview of the central topics in this rapidly expanding field. Each chapter opens with an introduction that helps students understand the central arguments and key concepts in the readings. The selections encourage students to think about the extent to which the three disciplines offer complementary or contradictory ways of approaching the relevant issues. Philosophy, Politics, and Economics: An Anthology is ideal for undergraduate PPE programs and courses in political philosophy and political economy.

Philosophy, Politics, and Economics: An Anthology

Politics & Social Sciences

Munger, Michael C.

Brennan, Geoffrey

Anomaly, Jonathan

Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey

Philosophy

Oxford University Press

This groundbreaking book by two distinguished scholars from different disciplines begins by outlining the psychology of esteem and the way the working of that psychology can give rise to an economy. It then shows how a variety of social patterns that are otherwise anomalous come to make a lot of sense within an economics of esteem. And it looks, finally, at the ways in which the economy of esteem may be reshaped so as to make for an improvement -- by reference to received criteria -- in overall social outcomes. While making connections with older patterns of social theorising, it offers a novel orientation for contemporary thought about how society works and how it may be made to work. It puts the economy of esteem firmly on the agenda of economic and social science and of moral and political theory.

The Economy of Esteem: An Essay on Civil and Political Society

Business & Money

Pettit, Philip

Economics

This groundbreaking book by two distinguished scholars from different disciplines begins by outlining the psychology of esteem and the way the working of that psychology can give rise to an economy. It then shows how a variety of social patterns that are otherwise anomalous come to make a lot of sense within an economics of esteem. And it looks, finally, at the ways in which the economy of esteem may be reshaped so as to make for an improvement -- by reference to received criteria -- in overall social outcomes. While making connections with older patterns of social theorising, it offers a novel orientation for contemporary thought about how society works and how it may be made to work. It puts the economy of esteem firmly on the agenda of economic and social science and of moral and political theory.

Norms are a pervasive yet mysterious feature of social life. In Explaining Norms, four philosophers and social scientists team up to grapple with some of the many mysteries, offering a comprehensive account of norms: what they are; how and why they emerge, persist and change; and how they work. Norms, they argue, should be understood in non-reductive terms as clusters of normative attitudes that serve the function of making us accountable to one another--with the different kinds of norms (legal, moral, and social norms) differing in virtue of being constituted by different kinds of normative attitudes that serve to make us accountable in different ways. Explanations of and by norms should be seen as thoroughly pluralist in character. Explanations of norms should appeal to the ways that norms help us to pursue projects and goals, individually and collectively, as well as to enable us to constitute social meanings. Explanations by norms should recognise the multiplicity of ways in which norms may bear upon the actions we perform, the attitudes we form and the modes of deliberation in which we engage: following, merely conforming with, and even breaching norms. While advancing novel and distinctive positions on all of these topics, Explaining Norms will also serve as a sourcebook with a rich array of arguments and illustrations for others to reassemble in ways of their own choosing.

Explaining Norms

Goodin, Robert E.

Eriksson, Lina

Southwood, Nicholas

The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy

Buchanan, James M.

Cambridge University Press

Should government's power to tax be limited? The events of the late 1970s in the wake of California's Proposition 13 brought this question very sharply into popular focus. Whether the power to tax should be restricted, and if so how, are issues of immediate policy significance. Providing a serious analysis of these issues, the authors of this 1980 book offer an approach to the understanding and evaluation of the fiscal system, one that yields profound implications. The central question becomes: how much 'power to tax' would the citizen voluntarily grant to government as a party to some initial social contract devising a fiscal constitution? Those in office are assumed to exploit the power assigned to them to the maximum possible extent: government is modelled as 'revenue-maximizing Leviathan'. Armed with such a model, the authors proceed to trace out the restrictions on the power to tax that might be expected to emerge from the citizen's constitutional deliberations.

The Power to Tax: Analytic Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution

Societies function on the basis of rules. These rules, rather like the rules of the road, coordinate the activities of individuals who have a variety of goals and purposes. Whether the rules work well or ill, and how they can be made to work better, is a matter of major concern. Appropriately interpreted, the working of social rules is also the central subject matter of modern political economy. This book is about rules - what they are, how they work, and how they can be properly analysed. The authors' objective is to understand the workings of alternative political institutions so that choices among such institutions (rules) can be more fully informed. Thus, broadly defined, the methodology of constitutional political economy is the subject matter of The Reason of Rules. The authors have examined how rules for political order work, how such rules might be chosen, and how normative criteria for such choices might be established.

Societies function on the basis of rules. These rules, rather like the rules of the road, coordinate the activities of individuals who have a variety of goals and purposes. Whether the rules work well or ill, and how they can be made to work better, is a matter of major concern. Appropriately interpreted, the working of social rules is also the central subject matter of modern political economy. This book is about rules - what they are, how they work, and how they can be properly analysed. The authors' objective is to understand the workings of alternative political institutions so that choices among such institutions (rules) can be more fully informed. Thus, broadly defined, the methodology of constitutional political economy is the subject matter of The Reason of Rules. The authors have examined how rules for political order work, how such rules might be chosen, and how normative criteria for such choices might be established.

Democratic Devices and Desires (Theories of Institutional Design)

This book offers a novel approach to the analysis of democracy, and an application of that approach to a variety of democratic institutions, including elections, representation, political parties and the separation of powers. Standard economic approaches to politics concentrate on the design of institutions and the role of individuals motivated by self-interest. The authors incorporate a broader view of political motivation, assuming individuals are moral as well as rational, and provide a wide-ranging discussion of the design of democratic institutions.

Hamlin, Alan

See the best price to sell, buy, or rent books by Brennan, Geoffrey. BookScouter helps to compare book prices from 25+ online bookstores and 30+ buyback vendors with a single search.

Books by Brennan, Geoffrey

See the best price to sell, buy, or rent books by Brennan, Geoffrey. BookScouter helps to compare book prices from 25+ online bookstores and 30+ buyback vendors with a single search.

Philosophy, Politics, and Economics: An Anthology

The Economy of Esteem: An Essay on Civil and Political Society

The Economy of Esteem: An Essay on Civil and Political Society

Explaining Norms

The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy

The Power to Tax: Analytic Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution

The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy

The Power to Tax: Analytic Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution

The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy

Democratic Devices and Desires (Theories of Institutional Design)